

SECRET

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Northern Ireland Office
Great George Street,
London SW1P 3AJ



Permanent Under Secretary of State
Sir Brian Cubbon KCB

19 September 1979

PUS/488/L

Sir Frank Cooper GCB CMG
Permanent Under Secretary of State
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1

Dear Sir Frank,

As you have sent to John Hunt and Michael Palliser a copy of the job description for the Ministry of Defence version of a Co-ordinator of Security in Northern Ireland, I am sending them with this letter a copy of the note giving the Northern Ireland Office version (which is basically the one I left with you and CGS on Monday morning).

Your job description has confirmed me in my view that the concentration on the search for "a name" has masked a deeper difference of view about the scope of the new central security arrangements in Belfast. Your document, by giving the Co-ordinator powers of direction, takes us way beyond anything we had envisaged in the original papers about a Security Directorate.

It may provide a helpful background to this evening's meeting between Mr Atkins and Mr Pym if I summarise the options as we see them.

Option 1.: greater SoSNI involvement supported by a strong official beavering away on operational matters.
No extra powers and no change in policy.

This is the existing NIO proposal, as set out in the attached note.

Possible candidates for the new post:

Alan Donald
(presently Ambassador in Kinshasa)

*Passage deleted and retained under
Section 3(4).*

Wayland

2 October 2012

1.

/Option 2.

SECRET

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

SECRET

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Option 2. : a Co-ordinator directly responsible to SoSNI, to be deputy chairman of the Security Policy Meeting and to have some powers of direction and a roving role over security and related matters.

This is the MOD job description.

We see these disadvantages:-

- i. Whatever the Chief Constable or the GOC said when consulted, the Co-ordinator could in the end give them directions. This "Director of Operations" role would be unacceptable to the Chief Constable on legal and policy grounds. The new role would be wholly counter-productive with the Royal Ulster Constabulary who would see it as a reversion to earlier arrangements long since discarded. (And would the GOC accept directions where he thought that they were militarily unsound, without his present right of appeal to the Chiefs of Staff?)
- ii. Even if the Co-ordinator had no powers of direction, the grand roving and inevitably interventionist role which is envisaged is more for a Minister answerable to Parliament. Security in Northern Ireland is not just a professional matter. The handling of incidents is highly political. Take the recent incidents which have caused operational disagreement (the PSF internment parade on 9 August, Carrickmore on Easter Monday, Dunloy etc) : a Minister would have to be directly involved if someone was interfering operationally on his behalf. Also the RUC would accept a "prompting and cajoling" manner from a Minister more easily than from a "British" official.
- iii. From a publicity point of view, the appointment could have a 24 hour impact, but thereafter the Co-ordinator would be very exposed personally within Northern Ireland.

Your candidates for the post are:-

Wright
(Ambassador in Bonn)

Moran
(Ambassador in Lisbon)

/Duff/

/Killick/

SECRET

SECRET

APPOINTMENTS - IN CONFIDENCE

Option 3. : if Ministers find Options 1 and 2 unsatisfactory and still want some new special arrangements, they may wish to consider the appointment of a Peer as a resident Minister of State in Northern Ireland dealing only with security matters. He would combine, under SoSNI, the gingering role envisaged for SoSNI in Option 1, together with getting about and working with the security forces and being seen to give some leadership. He would still need extra support from within the NIO organisation, but we agreed on the telephone that the Police and Army members of the new security unit (alias Directorate) within the NIO might be of Colonel and Chief Superintendent rank in view of the extra input at Ministerial level.

Such an appointment would avoid the disadvantages of Option 2 and could certainly add to a feeling of cohesion, momentum and leadership in the security effort. The disadvantage is the duplication with the SoSNI who would still be in charge of security and need to be seen to be in charge, in Cabinet, Parliament and Northern Ireland. The SoSNI would still chair the Security Policy Meeting for example. Present experience suggests that if the Police or the Army disliked the view taken by the Minister of State, the issue would quickly escalate at least to the Secretary of State himself. This duplication of role would contain the seeds of embarrassment if we were not very careful.

I am sending copies of this letter to Sir John Hunt and Sir Michael Palliser.

*Yours sincerely,
N. C. Sanderson.*

Dictated by Sir Brian Cubbon and signed in his absence

SECRET

SECRET
SECRET

6/ 18 SEP 1979
Dusk by 4:15

713



MUFAXED

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218 2119 (Direct Dialling)

01-218 8000 (Switchboard)

PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

RCM/79/1382
30/2

PUS/ 486
17 SEP 1979
N.I.O. LONDON

Mufax: to Puss's office
Bel fast
fr: Puss's office (L)

17 September 1979

cc Mr. Mayne

N Sanderson Esq
Private Secretary to
Sir Brian Cubbon KCB
Northern Ireland Office
Great George Street
London SW1

Dear Nick,

At the meeting this morning, Sir Brian Cubbon put forward a suggested approach to the work of the co-ordinator of Security Operations. Sir Frank thought Sir Brian might find of interest the attached draft job description which we had worked up here.

Y
MOT
Richard Mottram
R C MOTTRAM
Private Secretary

NORTHERN IRELAND
CO-ORDINATOR OF SECURITY OPERATIONS
JOB DESCRIPTION

1. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (SSNI) remains fully responsible for HMG's overall policy for Northern Ireland.
2. The Co-ordinator of Security Operations (CSO) would be a public servant of seniority, experience and standing, would be resident in Northern Ireland, and would be directly responsible to SSNI for:-
 - a. advising and assisting SSNI in the formulation of security policy objectives;
 - b. on behalf of SSNI, giving guidance and, as appropriate, direction to the Security Forces (SF);
 - c. on behalf of SSNI, identifying and co-ordinating those activities of departments and agencies in Northern Ireland required to support the total security effort.
3. The CSO would be a member, and vice-chairman, of the Security Policy Committee (SPC) which is chaired by SSNI.
4. The CSO would not command any elements of SF, which would remain under the command of the Chief Constable (CC) and the General Officer Commanding (GOC) respectively. Nevertheless, after consultation with them, the CSO would be empowered, on behalf of SSNI, to give directions to ensure the proper co-ordination of pla

SECRET

and operations to give effect to the agreed security policy. However, the CC would not be accountable to either SSNI or CSO on matters of law or its interpretation.

5. To assist him in the discharge of these responsibilities and tasks the CSO would have a small joint staff drawn from the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Army. His principal staff officers would be an Assistant Secretary, an Assistant Chief Constable, and a Brigadier.

6. The Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) would advise the CSO on intelligence matters and be responsible through him to SSNI for the direction and co-ordination of all intelligence activities concerning security.

7. The Under Secretary (Information and Political Affairs) would advise the CSO on the public relations handling of security operations, and would ensure that information activities are consistent with security policy and responsive to security considerations.

2

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

OUTLINE OF ADDITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND

The Secretary of State will involve himself more in security matters and spend significantly more time in Northern Ireland. His object will produce greater cohesion and momentum in the security effort and to demonstrate the Government's concern and involvement. There is a particular need for an operational plan for the border areas (3 brigade).

2. The Secretary of State will operate by prompting and gingering the Chief Constable and GOC through SPM, visits and other close contacts. He will have no extra powers. MOD will give the necessary general instruction to the GOC to operate the new arrangements.

3. The Northern Ireland Office will be strengthened by an extra pair of hands at senior /DUS7 level, who will enjoy the Secretary of State's confidence and act with his authority -

- a. visiting and acquiring a detailed, personal operational knowledge;
- b. directing a central planning unit;
- c. handling particular crises of a sort which require the Secretary of State's personal attention;
- d. playing a leading role at SPM, proposing policies, initiatives etc.;
- e. for these purposes, maintaining a 24 hour a day capability;

1.

/f...

SECRET

SECRET

- f. generally cajoling the RUC and the Army in order to secure implementation of the Secretary of State's security policy;
4. He will be called the Security Co-ordinator. He will not be a Director of Operations, in ^{the} name, powers, style or appearance. The RUC will continue to be in/lead in operational matters, tasking the Army to operate in support. The Government's security policy will continue unchanged.
5. The specification for the Co-ordinator is therefore:-
- i. a strong personality, able to operate by persuasion and in a style appropriate to dealing with both police officers and soldiers;
 - ii. having planning and operational experience and ingenuity;
 - iii. but not a "commander";
 - iv. and not a public figure.