

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

20

PS  
PS/SIR I GILMOUR  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR E YOUDE  
SIR J GRAHAM  
MR J C MOBERLY  
MR BRAITHEWAITE  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/UND  
HD/CONS D  
~~CONSULAR EMERGENCY UNIT~~  
HD/ES & SD  
HD/MAED  
HD/DEF D  
FUSD (2)  
NEWS D

NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
CABINET OFFICE DIO

MT

ADVANCE COPY

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

S. A. A. A.

GRS 400

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PARIS 101130Z OCT 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 847 OF 10 OCTOBER 1980

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON ABU DHABI DUBAI AND JEDDA

INFO SAVING TO BAGHDAD MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO

DUBAI TELNO 117 (NOT TO ALL): IRAQ/IRAN: FRENCH VIEWS

1. PRESIDENT GISCARD IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A ONE AND A HALF HOUR TRANSIT STOP IN THE UAE ON 14 OCTOBER (NOT 12 OCTOBER AS REPORTED IN ABU DHABI TELNO 322) ON HIS WAY TO CHINA AND A SIMILAR STOP ON HIS WAY BACK ON 22 OCTOBER. FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE NOT GIVEN US MUCH NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS BUT THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS WHAT YOU ALREADY KNOW.

2. LEVITTE, DEPUTY DIPLOMATIC ADVISER AT THE ELYSEE, TOLD THE HEAD OF CHANCERY ON 9 OCTOBER THAT GISCARD WOULD MEET SHAIKH ZAID IN ABU DHABI. ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE SOME BI-LATERAL QUESTIONS INCLUDING FOLLOW-UP TO THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED DURING PRESIDENT GISCARD'S VISIT LAST MARCH, DISCUSSION WOULD PROBABLY CONCENTRATE ON IRAN/IRAQ. PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS LIKELY

ABLY CONCENTRATE ON IRAN/IRAQ. PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS LIKELY TO REASSURE THE UAE OF FRENCH SUPPORT SHOULD THE CONFLICT SPREAD. LEVITTE THOUGHT THAT THIS RISK HAD FURTHER DIMINISHED SINCE THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN MY TELNO 831 (NOT TO ALL). HOWEVER, PRESIDENT GISCARD WAS PREPARED TO AUTHORISE FRENCH MILITARY ACTION. LEVITTE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT THIS ACTION MIGHT BE OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT MIGHT OCCUR, BUT HE IMPLIED IT WOULD BE AUTHORISED IF THE UAE OR FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION ON THIS SCORE WAS "NOT TO BE TAKEN LIGHTLY". LEVITTE ADDED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNITED STATES. ANY FRENCH (AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN) ACTION MIGHT BE LARGELY SYMBOLIC, BUT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACT ALONE, SINCE THIS COULD PROVIDE THE SOVIET UNION WITH A STRONGER PRETEXT FOR INTERVENTION. FINALLY LEVITTE SAID THAT THE PROVISION OF US EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN HANDLED SKILLFULLY. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE SEEN TO BE IN RESPONSE TO LOCAL REQUESTS.

3. ON CROWN PRINCE HASSAN OF JORDAN'S VISIT TO PARIS (AMMAN TELNOS 386 AND 490, NOT TO ALL), LEVITTE CLAIMED TO HAVE NO DETAILS OF THE TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GISCARD. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT HAD BEEN THE MAIN, AND PERHAPS ONLY, SUBJECT AND THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD HAD CAUTIONED THE JORDANIANS AGAINST DIRECT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD NO DETAILS OF PRESIDENT GISCARD'S MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ON 8 OCTOBER.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

HIBBERT

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 10/1218Z DA/GVL