

Weekend Box

(2)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister:  
You asked for three three  
pieces of background.

15 October 1980

*Ans*  
*1/4x*

*Ans*

*ms*

Dear Michael,

Iran/Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 13 October.

/A

I attach a copy of the 1971 Treaty of Friendship between the UAE and the UK. Exactly similar agreements were signed the same year with Bahrain and Qatar. None of these agreements mentions military matters. But all three agreements speak of the need to encourage educational, cultural and commercial links, and refer to 'consultation on matters of mutual concern in time of need'. This phrase provided the basis for the offer John Moberly recently made to UAE leaders on behalf of Lord Carrington to send an emissary to Abu Dhabi to discuss the UAE's security needs, following hints from prominent figures there that they would welcome some form of assurance from us. It does not however amount to any undertaking of a military nature. We have no defence agreement with the UAE.

/B

I enclose a copy of the text of the Security Council resolution No 479 which called on Iran and Iraq to end the fighting.

/C

I also enclose a background note on the 1975 Algiers Agreement.

*yours ever*  
*Roderic Lyne*

(R M J Lyne)  
Private Secretary

M O'D B Alexander Esq  
10 Downing St

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP  
BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Considering that the United Arab Emirates has assumed full responsibility as a sovereign and independent State;

Determined that the long-standing and traditional relations of close friendship and co-operation between their peoples shall continue;

Desiring to give expression to this intention in the form of a Treaty of Friendship;

Have agreed as follows :

Article 1

The relations between the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall be governed by a spirit of close friendship. In recognition of this, the Contracting Parties, conscious of their common interest in the peace and stability of the region, shall :

- (a) consult together on matters of mutual concern in time of need;
- (b) settle all their disputes by peaceful means in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties shall encourage educational, scientific and cultural co-operation between the two States in accordance with arrangements to be agreed. Such arrangements shall cover among other things :

- (a) the promotion of mutual understanding of their respective cultures, civilisations and languages;
- (b) the promotion of contacts among professional bodies, universities and cultural institutions;
- (c) the encouragement of technical, scientific and cultural exchanges.



UN RESOLUTION ON IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT ADOPTED BY SECURITY COUNCIL,  
26 SEPTEMBER 1980.

Having begun consideration of the item entitled 'The situation between Iran and Iraq',

Mindful that all member states have undertaken the charter obligations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Mindful as well that all members are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,

Recalling that under Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned about the developing situation between Iran and Iraq:

1. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to refrain immediately from any further use of force and to settle their dispute by peaceful means and in conformity with principles of justice and international law.
2. Urges them to accept any appropriate offer of mediation or conciliation or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice that would facilitate the fulfilment of their charter obligations.
3. Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict.
4. Supports the efforts of the Secretary-General and the offer of his good offices for the resolution of this situation.
5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within forty-eight hours.

## THE 1975 ALGIERS ACCORD BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND NOTE

1. In the early 1970s relations between Iran and Iraq were hostile. There was a long-standing dispute over the boundary in the Shatt-al-Arab river and the control of navigation there, as well as some disagreement over the land frontier. Iraq supported dissident movements among minority groups in Iran including the Arabs of Khuzistan and the Baluchis. Iran gave ever-increasing cross-border assistance to the Kurdish leader in Iraq, Mulla Mustapha Barzani, who had been at war with the Baghdad government on and off since the early 1960s. Iraq also resented Iran's occupation of three islands, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, in 1971 at the time of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. (The islands, situated near the Straits of Hormuz, had been in dispute between Iran and the Trucial States - now the United Arab Emirates.)

2. In 1975 Iran and Iraq signed agreements which in effect settled the main points of dispute between them until the Iranian revolution in 1979. These agreements consisted of

(a) A Joint Communiqué signed at Algiers in March 1975.

(b) A Treaty Relating to the State Boundary and Good Neighbourliness signed at Baghdad in June 1975. Attached to this were Protocols concerning the redemarcation of the land boundary, the delimitation of the river boundary, and border security.

(c) An Agreement on Regulations Concerning Navigation on the Shatt-al-Arab signed in Baghdad in December 1975.

3. These agreements meant that Iraq surrendered her claim to the waters of the Shatt-al-Arab beyond the thalweg (deep water channel), a claim based on historical and treaty right and till then bitterly defended; that she implicitly recognised Iran's occupation of the three Gulf islands; and that in return she obtained the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurds and demarcation of the land border.

4. The agreements worked well. The land border was demarcated and the Iraqis established control over the Kurdish north. Propaganda attacks

/ceased

ceased, and so did attempts at subversion. Detailed regulations for joint navigation in the Shatt-al-Arab were drawn up (control having previously been in the Iraqis' hands). It is not clear to what extent they were implemented, but neither side is known to have made complaints on the subject up to the time of the Iranian revolution.

5. For Iraq the most contentious issue in the 1975 agreements was the concession of a thalweg frontier in the Shatt-al-Arab. The frontier traditionally lay along the Iranian bank. This was recognised in international treaties going back to 1913 and most recently in the 1937 treaty between Iran and Iraq. (The 1913 Constantinople Protocol signed by Britain, Russia, Turkey and Persia did, however, provide for a thalweg frontier off Khorramshahr to facilitate navigation there, and the 1937 treaty provided additionally for a thalweg frontier off Abadan). In attempting to justify the present hostilities the Iraqis have argued that the 1975 treaty was imposed upon them by outside powers at a time when they were militarily weak. The Iranians, for their part, have argued in the past that it is not equitable for the frontier to lie on their side of the river; but elsewhere in the world there are examples both of international frontiers following the thalweg and of such frontiers following one bank of a river.

16 OCT 1980

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