

IRAN/IRAQ

ADVANCE COPIES

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PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
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(Stet.) || ~~MR J C NOBERLY~~
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S/R A. ACARD

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FM AMMAN 030900Z NOV

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 447 OF 03 NOV

INFO BAGHDAD, BONN, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, KUWAIT, LUXEMBOURG, MOSCOW,
PARIS, ROME, TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEWYORK, WASHINGTON.

MY TELNO 445 OF 1 NOVEMBER (NOT TO ALL):

IRAN/IRAQ

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON 1 NOVEMBER, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DEAL BETWEEN IRAN AND THE US ON THE HOSTAGES AND OF US AGREEMENT TO RELEASE DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO IRAN WERE UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND AND HAD BEEN THE MAIN TOPIC OF HIS RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE IRAQI PRESIDENT. HE EXPRESSED EXTREME CONCERN OVER THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS, ESPECIALLY IF AS A RESULT IRAN WERE EVENTUALLY TO COME OUT ON TOP IN THE WAR (THE FIRST TIME HE HAS MENTIONED THIS POSSIBILITY TO ME). HE SAID THAT FOR THE ARABS THIS WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES SQUEEZED BETWEEN IRAN AND ISRAEL: IT MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN.

2. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LONG LETTER TO SADDAM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT THE ISSUES AS HE SAW

2. THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE HAD WRITTEN A LONG LETTER TO SADDAM TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY, IN WHICH HE HAD SET OUT THE ISSUES AS HE SAW THEM AND THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ARAB WORLD. HE WAS EXPECTING THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER LATER THAT DAY AND HOPED TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS ALL THIS WITH HIM (TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS A BRIEF VISIT TO AMMAN BY HAMMADI, WHO WAS RECEIVED BY KING HUSSEIN AND LEFT FOR NEWYORK ON 2 NOVEMBER). HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SADDAM AGAIN THAT MORNING ON THE TELEPHONE.

3. THE KING SAID THAT HE THOUGHT SOME FORM OF EUROPEAN MOVE TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END WAS NOW MORE NEEDED THAN EVER AND HE HOPED SOMETHING MIGHT COME OF RECENT CONTACTS. ONE DIFFICULTY HE SAW WAS THAT, APART FROM OURSELVES AND THE FRENCH, THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE AREA. PRINCE HASSAN'S RECENT VISIT TO PARIS RECEIVED A BRIEF MENTION, BUT THE KING CLEARLY DID NOT WISH TO BE DRAWN ON IT.

4. THE KING REVERTED TO WHAT HE TERMED IRAQ'S KEEN INTEREST IN ACQUIRING CHIEFTAIN TANKS (SEE MY TELNO 430 OF 28 OCTOBER, PARA 6). I SAID THAT I DID NOT THINK WE COULD PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH THE IRAQIS WHILE THE CONFLICT WAS IN PROGRESS, AND HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD AT LEAST START THINKING ABOUT IT, LOOKING AT WHEN WE COULD OFFER DELIVERY ETC AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF IRAQ'S WISH TO LESSEN HER DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION.

5. THE KING DID NOT, EVEN BY IMPLICATION, LINK THIS QUESTION WITH THE DETAINED BRITISH SUBJECT (MY TUR, NOT TO ALL). BUT WHAT SEEMS TO BE SADDAM'S OBSESSION (SHARED BY THE KING) OVER THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF US MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAN, IRAQI ANGER OVER SOVIET REFUSAL TO ALLOW ARMS SUPPLIES TO GET THROUGH TO IRAQ (WHICH SADDAM DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE ADMITTED TO KING HUSSEIN UNTIL HIS LATEST VISIT TO BAGHDAD ON 27/28 OCTOBER) AND THE IRAQI DESIRE TO COUNTERBALANCE WHAT THEY SEE AS IMPENDING US RESUPPLY OF IRAN MUST, I THINK BE INFLUENCING THE IRAQIS IN THEIR DEALINGS ON THIS MATTER.

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