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TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 151 OF 29 JANUARY 1982
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN DESKBY 300800Z
INFO PRIORITY MODUK (D14B), JAKARTA (FOR PS/SEC. OF STATE),
INFO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, TEHRAN,
TEL AVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN, DOHA, ABU DHABI, DUBAI,
MUSCAT.

AMMAN TELNO. 48 (COPIED BY BOX TO JAKARTA): JORDAN/IRAQ

1. KING HUSSEIN'S DECISION TO RAISE A FORCE OF VOLUNTEERS IS UNWELCOME NEWS. HOWEVER INSIGNIFICANT ITS AFFECT MAY BE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR, JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IS THE FIRST OUTSIDE IRAN AND IRAQ THEMSELVES AND COULD CONCEIVABLY SET A PRECEDENT FOR OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES. IT ALSO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT JORDAN'S POSSIBLE STATUS AS A BELLIGERENT. WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM AMMAN, TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION FOR THE EMBASSY AND OTHER JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICES HERE. IN SPITE OF THE KING'S IMPRESSION (PARA. 3 OF TUR) THAT THE STEP DID NOT AMOUNT TO A DECLARATION OF WAR, THERE COULD BEN AN EFFECT ON OUR DEFENCE AND DEFENCE SALES RELATIONSHIP. THOUGH IT IS A LITTLE EARLY TO BE CERTAIN ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THIS.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO TRY TO RESTRAIN THE KING. WE DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR LOCUS STANDI AND WOULD NOT WISH TO SOUND THREATENING ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON OUR DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP. HIS HEART IS CLEARLY SET ON MAKING A POSITIVE GESTURE, HIS MOTIVE BEING AS MUCH APPREHENSION ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES FOR JORDAN AND THE GULF OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY AS JORDANIAN-IRAQI FRIENDSHIP. BUT HIS ACTION COULD HAVE AN UN-

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SETTLING EFFECT ON THE POSITION OF THE GULF STATES, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEED FOR BALANCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE DIFFERENT FROM JORDAN'S. (CF MUSCAT TELNOS 23 AND 24.)

3. IT WOULD BE SENSIBLE FIRST TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE AMERICANS AND SEE WHAT ACTION THEY ARE PREPARING TO TAKE. WE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN ASSOCIATING OURSELVES WITH FURTHER US-JORDANIAN EXCHANGES ON THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE KING'S DECISION. THE SUBJECT CAME UP BRIEFLY IN TALKS WITH VELIOTES TODAY, WHO SAID HE WAS PUZZLED BY THE KING'S DECISION AND DOUBTFUL OF ITS WISDOM: HE THOUGHT HOSTILITY TO SYRIA WAS AT THE HEART OF THE MATTER. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW WHAT FOLLOW-UP ACTION THE AMERICANS ARE CONTEMPLATING.

CARRINGTON

IRAQ/IRAN STANDARD

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