



DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
ELIZABETH HOUSE, YORK ROAD, LONDON SE1 7PH
TELEPHONE 01-928 9222
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Prime Minister (2)

MCS 31/3

The Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Treasury
Parliament Street
London
SW1P 3AG

Note

Asked Imogen White

to let us have their

considered view on Mrs

legal advice: by 8/4/82.

MCS 5/4

31 MARCH 1982

Sir Geoffrey,

TEACHERS' PAY IN ENGLAND AND WALES

The outcome of Thursday's meeting of the Burnham Committee is public knowledge, but I should report to you and colleagues on the events which led to it.

Most of the day's action lay in the Management Panel rather than in the Burnham Committee itself. The main phases of the action, over-simplified, were these:

- (a) the ACC, whose members had requisitioned the meeting, favoured a real attempt to discover whether a negotiated settlement was possible and at one stage proposed to take soundings on 4½% to test the teachers' attitude; that was defeated by the combined votes of the AMA (who continued to maintain that arbitration was the only sensible course) and my representatives in accordance with our instructions;
- (b) a proposal by the AMA to agree to arbitration was defeated by the votes of the ACC (believing that a negotiated settlement was preferable and achievable) and my representatives in accordance with our instructions;
- (c) pressed to explain what the employers saw as inconsistency in my position in these two votes, my representatives said my view was that the Panel might very reasonably make an offer akin to that made to the civil service;

- (d) this brought the associations together on the proposition that, if it was clear that my position was such that the ACC considered that it prevented their pursuing their quest for a negotiated settlement, then they would join with the AMA in agreeing to arbitration; on a proposal to offer 5.9% (to test my representatives' position) all the employers voted in favour and my representatives against; my veto had then to be formally exercised to block such an offer, and was respected; but an immediately following proposal to agree to arbitration was carried with two employers' representatives abstaining and only my representatives' weighted vote against; and
- (e) arbitration was then quickly agreed in the Burnham Committee itself.

This exercise of my powers under the concordat, though unsuccessful in stopping arbitration, has left the local authority employers very angry and embittered. The Chairman of the Management Panel (who is also Chairman of the ACC Education Committee) reconvened the Panel after the Burnham meeting to say that he thought the time had come "to tear up the concordat" because the way it had been used had effectively made it impossible for the local authorities to negotiate with their employees. I expect strong representations very soon from both associations, pressing not only for changes in the Remuneration of Teachers Act but also for earlier changes in practice under the Act as it stands, which may make it difficult for us to secure the second of the objectives in the third paragraph of my letter to you of 23 March - that is, to preserve our present degree of influence for use again on future occasions.

The arbitration on this disagreement in Burnham follows those earlier agreed on civil service pay and on Scottish teachers' pay. Formally, the Management Panel enter the arbitration having offered only 3.4% as against 4% offered in the other two cases; though it must be to our disadvantage that - very unfortunately in my view - the employers' vote in favour of a 5.9% offer has been publicly reported. You may be sure that I will do all I can within the Management Panel, both on the composition of the arbitral body and on the evidence to be presented to it, to work for the best outcome of arbitration that we can secure. I hope that the coincidence of interest between the local authorities and the Government in securing the least damaging outcome will prevail over the divisions and tensions arising from last Thursday's proceedings.

In the fourth paragraph of your letter of 18 March you suggested it might be as well to seek the views of the Attorney General now on the circumstances in which we could legitimately ask both Houses of Parliament to set aside an arbitration award. I have

done that, and enclose his response of 26 March, together with the letter of 19 March and minute of 16 March of Mr Harvey, my Legal Adviser, to which it refers.

Copies of this letter go to the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Attorney General, members of E(PSP) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Y
Linnon,

Kuri.

405 7641 Ext. 242-5688

Comments on this subject should
be addressed to

THE LEGAL SECRETARY
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Our Ref: 400/82/89

26 March 1982

Peter Harvey Esq

Department of Education & Science
Elizabeth House
York Road SFI

Dear Peter,

1. The Attorney General has considered the issues raised in your letter to Jim Nursaw of 19 March. As you point out, this is a subject which had a thorough airing in 1980, the particularly relevant documents being the letter of 9 July from the Attorney General to your then Secretary of State, of 21 July from John Biffen (as Chief Secretary to the Treasury) and of 25 July from the Attorney General to your Secretary of State and the Attorney's minute of 1 August 1980 to the Prime Minister. He has also seen a copy of your minute of 16 March 1982 which he endorses subject to the one reservation I refer to below.
2. You ask for a view as to the circumstances in which it would be proper to invoke s.4(2) of the Remuneration of Teachers Act 1965, but I am not sure how the Attorney can give a direct answer to that when we are still in the realms of hypothesis other than by repeating the words of the section, namely that national economic circumstances must require it. I note that you are also careful in your minute to avoid any further commitment. The Attorney agrees with the relevant factors you discuss in that minute, subject to the point I make below as to your paragraph 4. In particular, he agrees with the analysis in paragraph 5 of your minute as to the relevance of the level of pay settlements elsewhere in the public sector to which the Government is a party.
3. It follows from this agreement that the Attorney General's view is that the reference to the national economic circumstances is a reference to a factual situation. In the nature of the requirement, invocation of the section should be an exceptional step. This is fortified by the remarks made in Parliament during passage of the Bill signifying what was intended. Although these may not be relevant in courts of law, they are clearly important so far as the justification for and propriety of taking this step are concerned.

/4. The


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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS,
LAW OFFICERS' DEPARTMENT,
ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

- 2 -

4. The only reservation the Attorney General has on your minute relates to paragraph 4. He considers that it is not necessary to limit the concept of economic circumstances requiring a course of action to times of crisis or near crisis, although this is clearly when use of the procedure is most likely to be appropriate (see John Biffen's letter of 21 July 1980 and the Attorney's response of 25 July 1980). As the 1980 correspondence made clear, it could have been proper for the Government then to have taken the view that economic circumstances required overriding the arbitral award. Circumstances may then have been exceptional but it is not right to say that there was a crisis or near crisis. It remains possible that economic circumstances may require not giving effect to a particular award even though those circumstances are generally improving (although the Attorney General recognises that it may in practice be more difficult to do so). A relevant factor may be the "knock-on" effect of a particular award in the circumstances of the time.

5. Finally, you ask about the differences between this statutory requirement and the condition agreed to in relation to Civil Servants that an arbitral award may be set aside on grounds of overriding national policy. I presume this is in response to the concern expressed by the Secretary of State for Employment at the possible interaction of the arbitration procedures in this case and that of the Civil Service. As your minute points out (paragraph 6), the tests are entirely different. In the former, circumstances must be such as to require action; this connotes something more than expediency. In the latter, the Government may seek Parliamentary override when it considers it expedient to do so on grounds of national policy. Thus allowance of an arbitral award in the case of teachers would not prevent operation of the Parliamentary override in relation to a similar award for Civil Servants. However, having said that, the Attorney General recognises that much the same factors as set out in paragraph 5 of your minute would apply to the case of the Civil Service rendering it difficult to justify invocation of the procedure where there had been a succession of settlements of similar amounts (including the award to teachers). He should not be taken in this instance as putting forward any view as to the circumstances in which use of Parliamentary override in the case of the Civil Service could properly be claimed.

Yours sincerely

LAURENCE OATES



CONFIDENTIAL

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Telegrams Aristides London SE1
Telephone 01-928 9222 ext

Mr J Nursaw
Law Officers' Department
Attorney General's Chambers
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
LONDON WC2A 2LL

19 March 1982

Dear Jim,

REMUNERATION OF TEACHERS ACT 1965, SECTION 4(2)

You will be aware, in a general way, that the Burnham negotiations on teachers' pay are proving difficult. Though the management side of the Burnham Committee (as they are entitled to do) are at present refusing to agree to arbitration, there is a split on the issue between the ACC who are against, and the AMA, who are in favour of, arbitration. It is only realistic to recognise the possibility that at some point, it is difficult to say when, arbitration may be agreed.

The Secretary of State in that event would, in due course, be faced with an arbitral award which he would be obliged to implement under sections 4(1) and 2 of the Remuneration of Teachers Act 1965 (c3) unless the Government could invoke section 4(2), the "Two Houses resolution" provision.

In a letter to the Secretary of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said:-

"if you have doubts about the circumstances in which we could legitimately ask both Houses of Parliament to set aside an arbitration award, it might be as well to seek the views of the Attorney General now."

The Secretary of State appreciates that the Attorney General gave some advice on section 4(2) in the summer of 1980 and he has seen advice recently tendered by me (of which I sent you a copy addressed to Mallinson). He would, however, be grateful for the Attorney General's views as to the circumstances in which it

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would be proper to invoke section 4(2). Much would doubtless depend upon the level of the arbitral award and the Secretary of State would like to know how far the level of pay settlements elsewhere in the public sector, to which the Government are a party, might inhibit the invocation of section 4(2). More generally, he would welcome advice on the question whether there is any real difference between section 4(2) and the reservation made when the Civil Service was promised access this year to arbitration, which was to the effect that the Government reserved the right to ask the House of Commons to set aside an arbitral award on grounds of national policy. This seems to me to break down, in the main, into two partly interrelated questions, first, can the reference in section 4(2) to "the national economic circumstances" be equated with Government economic policy or is it a reference to a factual situation. Secondly, can the word "requires" in section 4(2) properly be construed as more or less synonymous with "renders it expedient" or does it come close to "unavoidable necessity".

There is a further question on which the Secretary of State would find the Attorney General's views helpful should he favour the view that "national economic circumstances" refers to a factual situation (even if it is not one on which he can give firm advice); it relates to the nature of the circumstances contemplated by section 4(2). I have already drawn attention to what the Attorney General said in the fourth paragraph of his letter to the Secretary of State on 9 July 1980 and expressed my own belief that it is only proper to invoke section 4(2) in a state of crisis or near crisis. While out of context the expression "national economic circumstances" is entirely neutral, it seems to me that in the context of section 4(2) the circumstances must at the very least be sufficiently bad to justify invoking what Parliament, in my judgement, intended to be an exceptional procedure.

Should the Attorney General wish for a conference, I am at his disposal. I should, perhaps, tell you that I am going north for the weekend and shall not be in the Office on Monday until lunch-time.

Yours sincerely

Peter Harvey

Peter Harvey

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr Halsey
Mr Langtry
Mr Mallinson (2
copies)

MR SIMPSON *[Signature]*

REMUNERATION OF TEACHERS ACT 1965 - SECTION 4(2)

1. Thank you for your minute of 15 March.

- 2.-(1) First, a note of caution. It seems to me not impossible that elements on the management side of the Burnham Committee, before agreeing to arbitration, may seek some assurance that, if the arbitration award was excessive (or at least in their view excessive), the Government would invoke section 4(2) of the Remuneration of Teachers Act 1965.

-(2) To state the obvious, whether or not it was appropriate to invoke section 4(2) would depend, first, on the precise recommendations of the arbitrator and, secondly, on the national economic circumstances prevailing when a decision fell to be taken. To indicate in advance that section 4(2) would be invoked could well be taken to be an indication that section 4(2) would be invoked to give muscle to Government pay policy without regard to the statutory criteria, something wholly improper. I think that care should be taken at this stage to say no more than that section 4(2) would be invoked if Ministers were satisfied that the national economic circumstances prevailing when the matter came up for decision required that the arbitral award be set aside.

- 3.-(1) While it may be convenient to use the phrase "the two Houses resolution procedure" as shorthand for action under section 4(2), I think it important that the use of shorthand should not lead to the statutory criteria being forgotten. The resolution which would have to be carried in both the Commons and the Lords would be "that the national economic circumstances require that effect should not be given to the recommendations".

-(2) While the precise "national economic circumstances" will always be to some extent a matter for judgement, such circumstances are factual ones which should be judged objectively and can scarcely be equated with Government economic policy. "Require" is a very strong word; Parliament used that word in section 4(2) and did not use some such expression as

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"[having regard to] [on the grounds of] the national economic circumstances [it is inexpedient/undesirable that effect] [effect should not] be given to the recommendations". As the Attorney General said in the fourth paragraph of his letter to the Secretary of State of 9 July 1980:-

"It is likely to be argued against you that this sub-section was contemplating a situation like the 1931 economic crisis and that its use in the present circumstances had not been intended by Parliament. HMG would therefore have to satisfy both Houses that the present national economic situation was the justification for the resolution and that it was not simply that HMG did not like the award."

4. If, as I believe, it is only proper to invoke section 4(2) in a state of crisis or near crisis, it would seem difficult for the Government to invoke the section at a time when they maintain that the economy is improving.

5.-(1) You ask in paragraph 3 of your minute what the relevance of other pay settlements in the 1981/82 pay round would be.

-(2) It seems to me that they could not be said to be irrelevant though no particular settlement, of itself, could be said to be conclusive. For example, even if national economic circumstances dictated a general pay freeze, there could still be, by way of exception, special cases without in any way casting doubt on the genuineness of the economic crisis. The fact that a particular pay settlement was made at a high level is not conclusive evidence that the national economic circumstances may not require that the generality of pay settlements be at a lower level. If, however, the generality of pay settlements to which the Government were a party (taking into account not only the number of settlements but also the numbers of staff covered by different settlements) were above X%, it would seem to me well nigh impossible for the Government, in good faith, to argue that an X% arbitration award for teachers should be set aside under section 4(2) unless they were also prepared to assert that there had been a sudden worsening in the economic circumstances.

6.-(1) In paragraph 4 of your minute you raise the question of the difference between the phrase "national economic circumstances" and the phrase "national policy".

-(2) As is implicit in paragraph 3(2) above, the two phrases seem to me significantly different. In the context of a Civil Service arbitration, "national policy" must, I would submit, mean Government policy of general application (ie not a Government policy applicable to the Civil Service alone). But the "national economic circumstances" refer to the factual state of the national economy and not to Government economic policies. It should also be noted that the phrase "on the grounds of" is much looser than "requires". "On the grounds of" looks to motive but, in my view, "requires" looks more to objective necessity.

7.-(1) May I remind you of a point I made when, in 1980, we were considering section 4(2).

-(2) It seems to me politically inconceivable that, if resolutions in pursuance of section 4(2) were moved, the Government would not in practice have to disclose what they were proposing, under section 4(3), to put in place of the arbitral award. It seems to me that, unless the award and the Government proposal were fairly wide apart, the argument that the national economic circumstances ruled out the one but permitted the other would look somewhat suspect and difficult to substantiate. It might well be that the level of the generality of pay settlements in the 1981/82 pay round, to which the Government by then would have been a party, would in practice lead the Government to propose to substitute something not all that less than the arbitral award. If that looked like being the case, I think that Ministers would be well advised to think twice before invoking section 4(2).

8. If section 4(2) is invoked and resolutions are carried in both Houses, even if it is argued by opponents of the Government that they have acted improperly or in bad faith, the effect of the resolutions cannot be challenged. As the Attorney General said in paragraph 7(2) of his letter of 1 August 1980 to the Prime Minister:-

"If the resolutions are passed in each House according to the correct procedure, there is no legal basis for attacking them;"

But it would, in my view, be improper for resolutions to be moved, even though the Government were satisfied that they could be carried with the help of the Whips, unless Ministers were in good faith satisfied that the case was such as Parliament contemplated in section 4(2).

Peter Harvey

Peter Harvey
16 March 1982



Prime Minister

(2)

CCJ V

MUs 31/3

2 pps
Education

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

ELIZABETH HOUSE, YORK ROAD, LONDON SE1 7PH

TELEPHONE 01-928 9222

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

ms

Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Howe QC MP
Chancellor of the Exchequer
HM Treasury
Parliament Street
London SW1P 3HE

31 March 1982

Geoffrey

PAY OF FURTHER EDUCATION TEACHERS IN SCOTLAND

If, as you wrote in your letter yesterday to George Younger, it would be an advantage to the Government (in terms of the pay round as a whole) to have an early settlement at 5½%, I am not clear why I had to instruct my representatives at Burnham last Thursday to veto any offer above 4% even if it would have secured a settlement.

We judged last week that the Government should be seen to be holding firm on a 4% line, even if outvoted by the local authority employer interests. As there is conveniently a meeting of E(PSP) tomorrow, we might take a moment to consider whether the same should not apply here also.

It may well be that there are other factors to take into account and I raise the issue simply so that we may seek as much coherence as possible.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, George Younger, Members of E (PSP), Nicholas Edwards and Sir Robert Armstrong.

but it was clear that 5-5½% would not have secured agreement at Burnham

George Younger



Prime Minister

(2)

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

01-233 3000

30 March 1982

The Chancellor was aware
of your 4% ceiling for

English and Welsh

teachers. But X

seems to have been

desire.

MUS 30/3

The Rt Hon George Younger MP
Secretary of State for Scotland
Scottish Office

George Younger

PAY OF FURTHER EDUCATION TEACHERS IN SCOTLAND

Thank you for your letter of 24 March.

The possibility of a 5½ per cent settlement with the Scottish further education teachers poses difficult issues both of substance and tactics. I realise, moreover, that you can only influence, and not determine, the line which the Management Side decide to take.

X | On the substance, my judgement is that an early settlement at 5½ per cent would on balance be helpful. A settlement at 4 per cent on the lines of what has already been offered would of course be better. But I imagine that the chances of this are negligible; and the result of holding the offer to 4 per cent would presumably be arbitration, as in the case of English and Welsh school teachers. Even if the outcome of arbitration was 5½ per cent (and a lower outcome would perhaps be unlikely), it would not have the advantage (in terms of the pay round as a whole) of giving us an early settlement at that level.

On the tactics, it is clearly of the utmost importance that 5½ per cent should only be offered if it will be accepted. A rejected 5½ per cent offer, or one which the Staff Side simply kept in play while they considered going to arbitration, would be very damaging.

On balance, my view is that your representatives should support a 5½ per cent offer, but only if there is near total certainty that it will be accepted. The employers will also need to be clear that the cost can be accommodated within the relevant cash limits. And my judgement is in any case subject to any worries which Keith Joseph might have about any possible adverse effects of a 5½ per cent settlement on the prospects for low settlements with further education teachers in England or with university teachers.

/Finally, on your



Finally, on your concluding paragraph, I think that it would be desirable for us to take the initiative in drafting the economic argumentation for inclusion in evidence to the arbitrator on Scottish school teachers. Perhaps your officials could clear with mine a suitable draft passage which could be tabled by the Management Side.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, Keith Joseph, Members of E(PSP), Nicholas Edwards and Sir Robert Armstrong.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "G. Howe".

GEOFFREY HOWE

A red circular postmark with the date "10 MAR 1982" and a central emblem. The numbers 1 through 9 are arranged around the inner edge of the circle.

A small red handwritten mark or stamp at the bottom right of the page.

26 March 1982

J M M Vereker Esq
No 10 Downing Street
LONDON
SW1

TEACHERS' PAY: ARBITRATION

At the Prime Minister's meeting about teachers' pay on the afternoon of 24 March I briefly explained how the arbitral body comes to be constituted when a disagreement in one of the Burnham Committees is referred to arbitration. It may be helpful if I set down for reference, and a little more fully, what I said then.

The arrangements for arbitration made by the Secretary of State under Section 3 of the Remuneration of Teachers Act, which in these respects are effectively unchanged since 1965, provide as follows:

"An arbitral body shall consist of three members, a Chairman, who shall be an independent person appointed by the Minister of Labour after consultation with the Panels, and two members who shall be selected by the Minister of Labour, one from each of two lists of not fewer than four persons each considered suitable by the Teachers Panel and by the Management Panel respectively of the relevant Committee."

The function here assigned to the Minister of Labour is now carried out by ACAS.

When appointing the Chairman to an arbitral body it is ACAS's practice to suggest four or five names, from their list of suitable independent persons, to the Panels of the Burnham Committee who are each asked to rank the names by order of preference. When appointing the side members ACAS ask each Panel to submit a list of four persons and it is the normal convention that ACAS appoint the first name on each list. The intention, and in all foreseeable circumstances the practical effect, of this is that neither Panel will be obliged to submit to arbitration under a Chairman whom they regard as unacceptable, and that each Panel will be able to secure the appointment of a side member whom they consider to be sympathetic to their interests.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

It is the Management Panel, and not the Secretary of State, that joins in these procedures. But the Secretary of State through his representatives, as constituent members of the Management Panel, joins in deciding the Panel's actions.

The arbitration arrangements also provide that:

"Evidence whether oral or written or both shall be given, in such form as the arbitral body may require, on behalf of the Teachers Panel as a whole and of the Management Panel as a whole respectively."

Again, the Secretary of State through his representatives joins with the local authority associations in formulating the evidence to be given by the Management Panel.

I am copying this to the Private Secretaries of the Ministers who were at Wednesday's meeting, and to Peter Gregson.

E H SIMPSON

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CJ



Prime Minister

(2)

SCOTTISH OFFICE
WHITEHALL, LONDON SW1A 2AU

Interesting support

for the line you took yesterday.

Mus 25/3

The Rt Hon Sir Keith Joseph Bt MP
Secretary of State for Education and Science
Elizabeth House
York Road
London
SE1 7PH

Copy to
PS/Mr Fletcher
PS/US of S
PS/SED
PS/CS
AUS of S
Mr Murray DH

25 March 1982

Dear Keith,

TEACHERS' PAY

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 23 March to Geoffrey Howe about teachers' pay.


As I reported in my own letter to Geoffrey of 17 March, the pay claim made by the Scottish school teachers went to arbitration after the Management Side had refused to make any offer in advance of 4%; and, as I indicated in my further letter of 24 March, the general line of the Management Side evidence in the arbitration is likely to be that the financial constraints imposed by the rate support grant cash limits leave the local authorities with no effective room for manoeuvre beyond the 4% limit. Against that background, any offer to the school teachers in England and Wales which goes substantially further than 4% (whether it results in a negotiated settlement or not) would obviously tend to weaken the Management Side's case in the Scottish arbitration and perhaps result in an arbitral award higher than it would otherwise have been.

You are of course in a better position than I am to judge the tactics for tomorrow's Burnham meeting, but I hope that it will not be necessary for the Burnham Management Side to move much beyond 4%, and certainly not to the 6 or 6½% level mentioned in the last page of your letter.

I am copying this letter to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Wales and Northern Ireland, the Attorney General, members of E(PSP) and Sir Robert Armstrong.

Yours sincerely,
George

11-5 MAR 1982



PRIME MINISTER

SCHOOL TEACHER PAY SCALES (E+W)

You asked for this.
Mr Carlisle has a copy ms

1 2 3 4 5
1/4/78 1/4/79 1/1/80 1/4/80 1/9/80

Scale	Min	1/4/78	1/4/79	1/1/80	1/4/80	1/9/80
<u>Scale 1</u> (141,500 teachers)	Min	2964	3231	3519	3972	4326
	Max	4662 (5010) ⁸	5082 (5463) ⁸	5514 (5928) ⁸	6228 (6696) ⁸	6807 (7320) ⁸
<u>Scale 4</u> (27,500 teachers)	Min	5010	5463	5928	6696	7320
	Max	6621	7218	7905	8937	9834
<u>Headteacher</u> ⁶ <u>Sp 5</u> (most common headteacher scale)	Min	6252	7032	7701	8706	9579
	Max	6939	7776	8514	9624	10593
<u>Headteacher</u> ⁷ <u>Sp 14</u>	Min	10,902	11883	13368	15150	17229
	Max	11,544	12585	14160	16047	18249

- 1 Pay rate on election day
- 2 Pay scales paid from 1 July 1979 backdated to 1 April 1979
- 3 First stage of Clegg award
- 4 Proposed arbitration award (ie 12% across the board)
- 5 These scales would include both the second stage of the Clegg award plus the second element of the arbitration award (2.6%)
- 6 Includes 6000+ headteachers
- 7 ~~Includes~~ Under 25 headteachers
- 8 Extended scale for good honours graduate