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FM WASHINGTON 240015Z JUN 82

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2220 OF 23 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, MODUK, ALL NATO POSTS

HAIG/GROMYKO MEETINGS

1. HAIG AND GROMYKO MET FOR A TOTAL OF NINE HOURS ON 18 AND 19 JUNE. BURT GAVE A BRIEFING FOR NATO EMBASSIES ON 22 JUNE. THIS FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE ACCOUNT IN HAIG'S MESSAGE TO YOU OF 20 JUNE (FCO TELNO 72 TO LUXEMBOURG) AND MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2206 (NOT TO ALL)

2. BURT SAID THAT THOUGH THE PRESS HAD REPORTED THE ATMOSPHERE AS TOUGH, THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN SERIOUS. BOTH HAIG AND GROMYKO HAD BEEN FIRM, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO MORE THAN THE USUAL AMOUNT OF POSTURING. THE CONVERSATION HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE IN PARTS. EQUAL TIME HAD BEEN ALLOTTED TO STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL QUESTIONS.

PRINCIPLES OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS

3. IN REPLY TO GROMYKO'S COMPLAINTS THAT THE U S HAD ABANDONED THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE EQUAL SECURITY UNQUOTE IN FAVOUR OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY, HAIG REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SET FORTH A BROAD FRAMEWORK FOR STABILITY, DISARMAMENT AND IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET/U S RELATIONS. BUT THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT WHICH HAD TO BE RESPECTED IF RELATIONS WERE TO IMPROVE. THE U S DEFENCE PROGRAMME WAS A RESPONSE TO THE CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, AND NOT AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY. STRICT EQUALITY WAS THE ONLY BASIS FOR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS. (BURT EMPHASIZED THAT QUOTE EQUALITY UNQUOTE WAS THE ONLY POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME OF THE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL TALKS). HAIG HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT QUOTE EQUAL SECURITY UNQUOTE WAS A NEBULOUS CONCEPT WHICH ALLOWED TOO MANY EXTRANEOUS ELEMENTS TO BE DRAGGED INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND MADE AGREEMENT VERY DIFFICULT.

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4. GROMYKO CRITICISED THE U S PROPOSALS AND RECALLED SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENTS, AND BREZHNEV'S UNILATERAL FREEZE ON SS20 DEPLOYMENT. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO CONSIDER PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES AS STRATEGIC SYSTEMS: THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT: THE U S WAS MANIPULATING DATA ON SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO DISPUTE THE FACTS ON THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE, IN WHICH THE U S CURRENTLY HAD AN ADVANTAGE. HE REITERATED THE SOVIET WARNING THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES WOULD ELICIT A SOVIET RESPONSE. HAIG SAID THE SS20 DEPLOYMENT HAD FURTHER WIDENED THE GAP IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION. A MORATORIUM WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AS WAS ANY IDEA OF COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. SOVIET THREATS WOULD BE COUNTER

PRODUCTIVE. HOWEVER HE WELCOMED SOVIET INDICATIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE SOME SS20S DEPLOYED BEYOND THE URALS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE REALISM THAT WAS NECESSARY TO GET THE GENEVA TALKS MOVING.

START

5. GROMYKO CRITICISED THE U S PROPOSAL AS ONE-SIDED AND INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS. HE SAID SALT II AND THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT OF 1974 SHOULD BE PRESERVED AND REMINDED HAIG THAT THE LATTER HAD PERMITTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ICBM'S IN RETURN FOR THE EXCLUSION OF U S FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS FROM SALT. GROMYKO SAID HE WAS IN FAVOUR OF REDUCTIONS BUT HAD NO PROPOSAL TO MAKE AT THIS STAGE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PRODUCE ONE AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. HAIG SAID THE U S START PROPOSAL WAS A SERIOUS ONE. BURT THOUGHT THAT, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT REFLECTED IN SUBSEQUENT RUSSIAN COMMENT, HAIG HAD SUCCEEDED IN GETTING ACROSS THAT WHILE THE U S PROPOSAL CALLED FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA OF ICBM'S WHERE THE SOVIETS WERE PREDOMINANT, IT CALLED FOR SACRIFICES ALSO BY THE U S ON SLBM'S WHERE THE U S WAS PREDOMINANT. HAIG EMPHASIZED REAGAN'S COMMITMENT TO DEEP REDUCTIONS, AND THE MUTUAL INTEREST IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE MOST DE-STABILISING SYSTEMS, BUT REPEATED THAT IN THE AMERICAN VIEW NOTHING WAS EXCLUDED FROM NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT, CRUISE MISSILES AND FUTURE SYSTEMS. HE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ADOPT THE SAME ATTITUDE. THE U S WAS PREPARED TO LISTEN SERIOUSLY TO THEIR PROPOSALS. HAIG SAID THAT SALT II WOULD NOT BE RATIFIED BUT ITS POSITIVE ELEMENTS WOULD BE PRESERVED, AND THE U S WOULD NOT UNDERCUT EXISTING AGREEMENTS SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION DID THE SAME. GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ABIDE BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS. THEREFORE, BURT SAID, START WOULD PROCEED ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT. BURT SAID THAT IN INF AND START, THE UNITS OF ACCOUNT IN BOTH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE THE SAME, AND THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS WOULD THEREFORE BE COMPATIBLE.

6. BURT SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF MBFR. ON NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE BUILDING (THE QUOTE BERLIN INITIATIVE UNQUOTE) THE AMERICANS WOULD BE GIVING MORE DETAIL ABOUT THEIR THINKING TO THE RUSSIANS. CSCE WAS NOT RAISED.

REGIONAL QUESTIONS

7. HAIG TOLD GROMYKO THAT, ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT APPLYING A POLICY OF MECHANICAL LINKAGE BETWEEN REGIONAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES, SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS COULD NOT BUT AFFECT THE PROSPECT IN OTHER AREAS, SPECIFICALLY ARMS CONTROL.

POLAND

8. GROMYKO HAD INSISTED THAT HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND, BUT REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST THE U S ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND POLAND. HE TOOK PARTICULAR UMBRAGE THAT THE DECISION ON THE PIPELINE WAS TAKEN AND ANNOUNCED

DURING HIS TALKS WITH HAIG. HAIG SAID THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN INDEPENDENT OF THE MEETING. HAIG ALSO REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN QUOTE EXPLOSION UNQUOTE INSIDE POLAND IN THE SUMMER OR AUTUMN, WHICH WOULD NOT BE IN THE SOVIET INTEREST. THE PATH TO STABILITY LAY THROUGH THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION, A DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY RELEASE OF PRISONERS, AND THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW. U S SANCTIONS WERE AIMED AT ACHIEVING MOVEMENT TOWARDS THESE OBJECTIVES, NOT AT ANY FORM OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. HE REPEATED U S PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND, INCLUDING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

CARIBBEAN

9. GROMYKO CALLED FOR A RELAXATION OF U S PRESSURE AGAINST CUBA AND NICARAGUA, SAYING THAT THE U S HAD NOTHING TO FEAR, AND SHOULD ESTABLISH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT LARGE SCALE SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET ARMS TO CUBA, BUT WAS PREPARED FOR A DIALOGUE. HE REFERRED TO THE CONTACTS THAT HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE AND SAID IT WAS NOW UP TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA TO SHOW BY THEIR ACTIONS THAT THEY WANTED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U S.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

10. BURT SINGLED OUT SOUTHERN AFRICA AS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE ITEM IN THE DISCUSSION. GROMYKO SAID THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A SETTLEMENT AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE CUBAN TROOPS RETURN ONCE NAMIBIA HAD BEEN GRANTED ITS INDEPENDENCE, WHEN INTERNAL THREATS HAD BEEN REMOVED AND IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT. HAIG SAID THAT SUCCESS MIGHT BE WITHIN REACH IF A MEANS COULD BE FOUND TO REMOVE CUBAN COMBAT FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE. THE U S INTENDED TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. IF THE SOVIET UNION STOOD IN THE WAY THEY WOULD BE ISOLATED INTERNATIONALLY. GROMYKO ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO SAVIMBI IN SUCH A SETTLEMENT. HAIG INDICATED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT.

AFGHANISTAN

11. BURT WAS ASKED WHETHER THE IDEA OF CONTINUING TALKS AT OFFICIAL LEVEL ON AFGHANISTAN WAS A NEW OPENING, OR SIMPLY A MEANS OF DISPOSING OF THE SUBJECT. BURT SAID IT WAS NEITHER. HE DID NOT EXPECT GREAT PROGRESS BUT IT WAS WORTH DISCUSSING THE QUESTION, AND HE EXPECTED THAT TALKS AT EXPERT LEVEL WOULD BE HELD NEXT MONTH IN MOSCOW (FCO TELNO 1204 TO WASHINGTON).

MIDDLE EAST

12. GROMYKO BLAMED THE AMERICANS FOR THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, WHICH HE SAID WAS GROSS PROVOCATION. HE SAID THAT A MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE ONLY MEANS TO

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DEAL WITH THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HAIG REJECTED CHARGES OF U S COMPLICITY, AND SAID HE HAD BEEN WORKING HARD TO PREVENT THE TRAGEDY. THE SOVIET UNION HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE BREAK-DOWN OF THE CEASEFIRE BY ITS SUPPLIES OF ARMS TO THE PLO. THE U S SUPPORTED SCR'S 508 AND 509, AND FAVOURED THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES FROM LEBANON. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT AN ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF LEBANON; THE PALESTINIANS MADE NO CLAIM ON LEGITIMATE ISRAELI TERRITORY, AND THEIR DESIRE FOR STATEHOOD WAS JUSTIFIED.

13. BURT SAID HAIG HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY STRUCK BY THE CONTINUING CAUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HAD USED SOME GENERAL LANGUAGE ABOUT THEIR CONCERN IN EVENTS SO CLOSE TO THEIR BORDERS, BUT THEIR OVERALL ATTITUDE WAS VERY CAUTIOUS.

14. ON IRAN/IRAQ, HAIG HAD CRITICISED GROMYKO FOR SUPPLYING ARMS TO BOTH SIDES. GROMYKO HAD RETORTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SOLD ONLY A SMALL QUANTITY OF SPARE PARTS, BUT BOTH SIDES HAD SPREAD RUMOURS OF MAJOR SOVIET SUPPLIES TO THE OTHER.

KAMPUCHEA

15. GROMYKO HAD CALLED ON THE U S TO STOP SUPPORTING POL POT FOR THE KAMPUCHEAN SEAT AT THE UN. HAIG REPLIED THAT THE U S HAD NO INTENTION OF IMPOSING ANY REGIME ON KAMPUCHEA, BUT THAT VIETNAM WAS ILLEGALLY OCCUPYING THE COUNTRY. THE U S FAVOURED SELF-DETERMINATION BY KAMPUCHEANS, AND WOULD DEAL WITH HANOI ONLY IF IT WITHDREW ITS FORCES AND PERMITTED SELF-DETERMINATION TO TAKE PLACE.

CHINA

16. GROMYKO SAID THAT U S ARMS SALES TO CHINA WOULD AFFECT SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND WOULD BE MONITORED CAREFULLY. HAIG SAID THAT THE U S INTENDED TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH CHINA. THEY WOULD NOT PLAY THE QUOTE CHINA CARD UNQUOTE, BUT WOULD NOT PERMIT A SOVIET VETO OVER U S RELATIONS WITH CHINA.

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SUMMIT

17. AFTER EXPRESSING REGRET THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOT COME TO UNSSOD AND MET REAGAN, HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN FAVOUR OF A SUMMIT FOR ITS OWN SAKE AND THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE COMING MONTHS. GROMYKO SHARED HIS VIEW ON THE NEED FOR CAREFUL PREPARATION.

HENDERSON

[REPETITION TO REYKJAVIK REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED
AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]
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TO IMMEDIATE LUXEMBOURG

TELNO 72 OF 20 JUN

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY FROM RESIDENT CLERK: HAIG/GROMYKO.

1. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE JUST DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING LETTER
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM MR HAIG:-

DEAR FRANCIS:

MY MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO ON JUNE 18 AND 19 LASTED FOR MORE THAN
NINE HOURS AND ADDRESSED THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES -- INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL QUESTIONS, BILATERAL
PROBLEMS -- WHICH WE HAD COVERED IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS. AGAINST
THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP, THE IMPRESSIVE DEGREE OF
ALLIED UNITY AT VERSAILLES AND BONN, AND THE COMPREHENSIVE ARMS
CONTROL PROGRAM WE HAVE PUT ON THE TABLE, GROMYKO SEEMED TO BE ON
THE DEFENSIVE. HE COMPLAINED FORCEFULLY AND AT LENGTH THAT OUR
ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS ARE ONE-SIDED AND HAVE NOT TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON "EQUAL SECURITY." AS IN OUR
PREVIOUS MEETINGS, HE TRIED TO EVADE SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
DETERIORATION OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND INCREASED INTER-
NATIONAL TENSIONS GENERALLY BY SHIFTING THE BLAME TO US. MY
RESPONSE FORCEFULLY REITERATED OUR CONVICTION THAT IT IS THE

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SOVIETS THEMSELVES WHO HAVE CONSISTENTLY VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT WHICH ARE THE ONLY HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL WORLD. I REITERATED THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERE DESIRE FOR A STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP, BUT THAT THIS DEPENDS ON SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EXERCISE INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT.

THE JUNE 13 DISCUSSION, WHICH LASTED FIVE HOURS, WAS HEAVILY DEVOTED TO ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. GROMYKO STRONGLY CRITICIZED OUR PROPOSALS WHILE PRESSING HARD FOR THE RESUSCITATION OF INADEQUATE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS OF THE PAST, ESPECIALLY THE 1974 VLADIVOS-TOK UNDERSTANDING AND THE SALT II TREATY. HE REITERATED THE SOVIET NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE PLEDGE HE MADE AT THE UN ON TUESDAY.

IN RESPONSE, I TOLD HIM IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT STRICT EQUALITY IS THE ONLY BASIS FOR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN US: THAT PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS WERE INADEQUATE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT PROVIDE FOR SUCH EQUALITY AND BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO LIMIT THE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC SYSTEMS: AND THAT EQUITABLE AND SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN SUCH SYSTEMS ARE THE ONLY MEANS OF ENSURING STRATEGIC STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, I MADE CLEAR THAT WE WILL CONSIDER SERIOUSLY SOVIET PROPOSALS AND THAT NOTHING IS RULED OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT THE NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE PLEDGE IS ENTIRELY SELF-SERVING GIVEN THE TREMENDOUS SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE AND REITERATED THAT NATO WOULD NEVER BE THE FIRST TO USE FORCE OF ANY KIND IN EUROPE. IN SUM, I CHALLENGED GROMYKO TO STOP POSTURING AND GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH US IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE.

OUR SECOND DAY OF DISCUSSIONS WAS DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO REGIONAL ISSUES. GROMYKO LISTENED IMPASSIVELY TO MY PRESENTATION ON THE URGENT NEED FOR POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN POLAND. HE REACTED STRONGLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS ON POLISH SANCTIONS, BUT I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS COULD NOT BE INSULATED FROM THE IMPACT OF IRRESPONSIBLE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. GROMYKO DISCUSSED AFGHANISTAN IN FAMILIAR TERMS BUT DID AGREE THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE WITH INTENSIFIED

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/DISCUSSIONS

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DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE THROUGH OUR RESPECTIVE EMBASSIES. I UNDERSCORED AGAIN THAT THE SOVIET OCCUPATION REMAINS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO IMPROVEMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

GROMYKO PRESSED HARD ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SEEMED ANXIOUS TO CLAIM A SOVIET ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY. HE PUSHED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, LINKING IT TO RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON. I REPLIED THAT WE INTEND TO CONTINUE ENERGETICALLY WITH OUR OWN EFFORTS IN THE REGION, WHICH OFFER THE MOST PROMISING AVENUE TO PEACE.

PERHAPS GROMYKO'S MOST POSITIVE COMMENTS ON REGIONAL ISSUES CONCERNED SOUTHERN AFRICA. HE HINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE WILLING TO STEP ASIDE AND PERMIT THE CONTACT GROUP INITIATIVE TO PROCEED, BUT HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE MPLA REGIME IN ANGOLA IF IT WERE FORCED TO CONSIDER A RECONCILIATION WITH SAVIMBI. I MADE CLEAR THAT, IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE THEIR DISRUPTIVE TACTICS, THEY WILL ONLY ISOLATE THEMSELVES. I ALSO RAISED CUBAN DESTABILIZING ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA, BUT GROMYKO'S REPLIES WERE STANDARD SOVIET FARE.

AT THE CLOSE OF OUR SECOND MEETING, GROMYKO ASKED FOR MORE PRECISE DETAILS ON OUR COMMITMENT NOT TO UNDERCUT EXISTING STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT. I REPLIED THAT WE ARE COMFORTABLE WITH EXISTING POLICY, AND THAT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT GENEVA.

GROMYKO ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT. I EXPRESSED REGRET THAT BREZHNEV HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN HERE, AND REPEATED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SUCH A MEETING IN THE FUTURE WHEN POSITIVE RESULTS MIGHT BE EXPECTED.

FINALLY, I RAISED WITH GROMYKO A NUMBER OF HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, INCLUDING THAT OF SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION AND REMINDED HIM OF THE

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PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN EARLY PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

OVERALL, I CAME AWAY IMPRESSED HOW WORRIED AND DISTURBED GROMYKO WAS AT THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE HAVE SEIZED THE HIGH GROUND AND THE INITIATIVE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS IS IN LARGE MEASURE DUE TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM WE HAVE PROPOSED AND THE IMPRESSIVE DEGREE OF UNITY AMONG US ON IT. AT THE SAME TIME, GROMYKO'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS OUR PROPOSALS INDICATE CLEARLY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD WILL BE DIFFICULT. I BELIEVE THE MEETING WAS USEFUL IN MAKING ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT OUR FULL AGENDA IS INTACT, AND THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD ON A BROAD FRONT IF THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO ADDRESS THE FULL RANGE OF OUR CONCERNS.

BEST REGARDS,
SINCERELY,
ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2168 OF 17 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW AND
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HAIG/GROMYKO

MT.

1. HAIG WILL MEET GROMYKO TOMORROW IN NEW YORK. THERE MAY BE A FURTHER MEETING ON SATURDAY OR MONDAY IF THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST ONE JUSTIFY THIS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXPECT THE FOLLOWING SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED.

- (A) START. GROMYKO IS EXPECTED TO QUESTION WHETHER THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL IS QUOTE SERIOUS UNQUOTE, ARGUING THAT THE 50 PERCENT SUB-LIMIT ON LAND-BASED ICBMS AND THE EXCLUSION OF BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT BY THE UNITED STATES TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. HAIG WILL POINT OUT THAT, AS HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE ALREADY STATED, THE AMERICANS WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS BOMBERS AND OTHER ISSUES.
- (B) POLAND. HAIG WILL PLACE A GREAT DEAL OF EMPHASIS ON THIS, ARGUING THAT IF THE SOVIET AND POLISH AUTHORITIES CONTINUE ON THEIR PRESENT COURSE, THIS WILL NOT LEAD TO ECONOMIC, POLITICAL OR SOCIAL RECOVERY. THERE WILL BE NO THREATS OF FURTHER US MEASURES AND HAIG DOES NOT EXPECT TO GO INTO DETAIL ABOUT A POSSIBLE AID PACKAGE FOR POLAND IF ALLIANCE CONDITIONS ARE MET (THOUGH THERE IS SOME FURTHER THINKING GOING ON HERE ABOUT THIS). GROMYKO WILL BE LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE US ATTITUDE AND CONCERN ABOUT POLAND; NOTWITHSTANDING THE DECISIONS TO PROCEED WITH START AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES.
- (C) HAIG WILL READ GROMYKO THE USUAL LECTURE ABOUT THE NEED FOR SOVIET QUOTE RESTRAINT UNQUOTE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT CONFESS, HOWEVER, THAT ON THIS OCCASION HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE A BUMPY RIDE AS GROMYKO WILL CERTAINLY DRAW ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO EXERCISE QUOTE RESTRAINT UNQUOTE OVER ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE LEBANON.
- (D) HAIG IS NOT EXPECTED TO SAY MUCH ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA, THOUGH HE WILL EXPRESS CONTINUING US CONCERN ABOUT THE ARMS BUILDUP IN CUBA AND CUBAN SUPPORT FOR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. HE ALSO PROPOSES TO WARN GROMYKO THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA WOULD CAUSE FURTHER SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.
- (E) HAIG WILL ALSO BE TRYING TO PROBE GROMYKO FURTHER ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING THE RUSSIANS TO ENCOURAGE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ^{ANGOLA} NAMIBIA AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF SECURING A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND TO BRING HOME TO GROMYKO THE DANGERS OF BLOCKING ATTEMPTS TO REACH SUCH A SETTLEMENT.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 205 OF 22 JANUARY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW.

HAIG/GROMYKO MEETING.

1. SCANLAN (DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS), WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING HAIG TO GENEVA, TELLS US THAT HAIG WILL SEE NITZE BEFORE HE SEES GROMYKO, BUT HAS NO INTENTION OF GETTING INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE IS SOME NEW SOVIET MOVE, OF WHICH THERE IS AT PRESENT NO INDICATION. AS ALREADY REPORTED (RENWICK'S LETTER OF 14 JANUARY TO WESTON), WHEREAS THE INTENTION BEFORE THE POLISH CRISIS HAD BEEN TO USE THE MEETING TO DECIDE A DATE FOR THE OPENING OF START, HAIG DOES NOT NOW CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE OR APPROPRIATE TO DO SO. HAIG WILL INDICATE TO GROMYKO THAT THE U.S. IS PROCEEDING WITH THE PREPARATIONS AND WILL BE READY TO OPEN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THESE ARE COMPLETED AND THE TIMING IS SUITABLE. (WORK WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY IS CONTINUING ACTIVELY ON THE U.S. NEGOTIATING POSITION, WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND ACDA AIMING FOR THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS IN APRIL PROVIDED THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE PERMITS.)

2. HAIG WILL REMIND GROMYKO THAT IN THEIR MEETING IN SEPTEMBER HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD DEPEND ON RESTRAINT AND RECIPROCITY. SINCE SEPTEMBER THE RUSSIANS HAD MOVED MORE TROOPS INTO AFGHANISTAN: MIG23S HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO CUBA: THERE WAS TALK OF MIG21S FOR NICARAGUA: THEY HAD INCREASED THEIR ACTIVITIES IN ANGOLA AND THEY HAD PRESSED THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT TO CRUSH SOLIDARITY. IN THE ABSENCE OF SOVIET RESTRAINT, THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED ON MEASURES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND WAS RE-EXAMINING ALL ASPECTS OF U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS. SUCH MEASURES WERE ALL REVERSIBLE, DEPENDING ON AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. HAIG WOULD NOT THREATEN FURTHER MEASURES. HE WOULD LEAVE GROMYKO TO DRAW HIS OWN CONCLUSIONS.

3. GROMYKO, SCANLAN COMMENTED, COULD BE EXPECTED TO ARGUE ON STANDARD LINES THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD CREATED TROUBLE IN POLAND BY SUPPORTING SOLIDARITY AND WAS NOW BLAMING THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES WAS ANTI-SOVIET AND AGAINST ARMS CONTROL AND WAS SEEKING TO USE POLAND TO AVOID LAUNCHING NEGOTIATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS, WHICH THEY WISHED TO AVOID.

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4. ON FURTHER U.S. MEASURES, SCANLAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT, APART FROM TIGHTENING UP THE MEASURES ALREADY DECIDED, THE ONLY REAL LEVERAGE AVAILABLE TO THE AMERICANS WAS OVER (A) DEBT AND (B) GRAIN. ON DEBT, HE SAID THAT THE POLES WERE NOW TELLING THE COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT THE ARREARS OF PAYMENT ON THE 1981 DEBT WOULD BE MET BY FEBRUARY. THE AMERICANS FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES BELIEVED THAT THESE SUMS WERE BEING PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET UNION, REFLECTING OFF-SETTING BORROWING BY THE SOVIET UNION FROM WESTERN BANKS. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED THE POLES TO MAINTAIN SOME SEMBLANCE OF CONTINUED CREDIT-WORTHINESS (AND IT LOOKED AS IF THEY WOULD WANT THEM TO PROCEED WITH THE IMF APPLICATION). SCANLAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE SOME HERE WHO WERE TOYING WITH THE IDEA OF INVOKING THE "TANK" CLAUSE. THE TREASURY SECRETARY HAD MADE CLEAR IN DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT ANY MOVE TO FORCE THE POLES TO DEFAULT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS AND UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES WITHIN THE WESTERN BANKING SYSTEM.

5 SCANLAN SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER HAIG/GROMYKO MEETING WOULD BE KEPT OPEN THOUGH NO DATE WOULD BE SET FOR THIS. HAIG IS LIKELY TO SEND YOU A FURTHER MESSAGE BEFORE THE MEETING.

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FROM UKDEL NATO 100257Z DEC 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 457 OF 10 DECEMBER

INFO PRIORITY (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR/MINISTER)

BONN PARIS WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW

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FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

QUADRIPARTITE DINNER 9 DECEMBER: US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

1. HAIG, ASKED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA ON 26-27 JANUARY, MADE SOME ALMOST RANDOM POINTS IN REPLY:

I. HE HAD TALKED TO GROMYKO IN NEW YORK ABOUT THE VERY HEAVY FLOW OF SOVIET ARMS INTO CUBA, WHICH WAS RUNNING AT THREE TIMES THE LEVEL IN RECENT YEARS. THE RUSSIANS CLAIMED THEY WERE DESIGNED TO MODERNISE THE CUBAN FORCES BUT THE AMERICANS SUSPECTED THAT ARMS WERE GOING TO OTHER DESTINATIONS.

II. HAIG AND GROMYKO HAD ALSO TALKED ABOUT NAMIBIA, AND GROMYKO HAD NOT APPEARED RIGIDLY OPPOSED TO THE IDEA THAT A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE DEALT WITH TOGETHER (QUOTE THE OMELETTE FORMULA UNQUOTE RATHER THAN CHICKEN AND EGG). HAIG SAID THAT THE US INTENDED TO GIVE THIS SUBJECT PRIORITY IN THE TALKS IN JANUARY. THEY FOUND THE ANGOLANS AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES INCREASINGLY INTERESTED IN THIS APPROACH, AND THERE WERE SOME SIGNS THAT THE CUBANS MIGHT BE TOO. HAIG ADDED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT SOUTH AFRICAN INCURSIONS INTO ANGOLA HAD GIVEN THE CUBANS CAUSE FOR THOUGHT.

III. ON AFGHANISTAN, HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT. GROMYKO HAD SAID NOTHING NEW IN NEW YORK BUT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER SUBSEQUENTLY WITH DOBRYNIN. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT COME FORWARD IN JANUARY WITH SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS INCLUDING SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, ASSURANCES OF NO MORE BORDER CROSSINGS OR DIFFICULTIES FROM THE PAKISTAN SIDE, THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THE INCUMBENT REGIME. THE LAST WAS THE HARDEST FOR THE RUSSIANS AND THEY MIGHT SEEK TO LEAVE THE IDEA OF A REFERENDUM OR SELF-DETERMINATION UNTIL QUOTE LATER UNQUOTE. THE AMERICANS WERE STUDYING THE WHOLE QUESTION AND HAIG WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIS COLLEAGUES BEFORE HE MET GROMYKO. MEANWHILE THE SOLID ATTITUDE OF THE TEN HAD BEEN AS MUCH A SOURCE OF STRENGTH AS THAT OF THE ISLAMIC COUNTRIES.

IV. ON ARMS CONTROL, HAIGH SAID HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO GET THE START TALKS UNDER WAY IN EARLY SPRING (HAIG MENTIONED THAT DATE AND VENUE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE US PROPOSALS, BUT GAVE NO INDICATIONS OF WHAT IF ANY SUBSTANCE MIGHT BE INVOLVED). ON INF HAIG EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION AND POINTED TO THE BRIEFING THAT NITZE WOULD BE GIVING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON 10 DECEMBER. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION IN THE ALLIANCE BEFORE THE MEETING WITH GROMYKO, BUT THE AMERICANS WERE NOT LOOKING FOR DEPARTURES FROM THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION.

V. ON US-SOVIET BILATERAL QUESTIONS, HAIG SAID THAT SOME POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY KEPT ON THE BACK BURNER (HE CITED THE LONG TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT). WORK WAS GOING AHEAD ON A MARITIME AGREEMENT. (EAGLEBURGER PROMPTED THAT THE SAME WAS TRUE OF THE KIEV CONSULATE.) IT MIGHT BE TOO EARLY AT THE JANUARY MEETING TO OPEN THE DOOR TO A SUMMIT, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN WANTED SOMETHING MEANINGFUL AND NOT ANOTHER VIENNA. BUT THE MEETING MIGHT NEVERTHELESS QUOTE GIVE US A BETTER BRACKET UNQUOTE ON THE RIGHT TIME TO FIX A DATE. HAIG ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF BREZHNEV'S HEALTH AND THAT AMERICAN EXPERTS GAVE HIM A YEAR OR TWO AT THE OUTSIDE (GENSCHER, AFTER DESCRIBING BREZHNEV'S PERFORMANCE DURING HIS VISIT TO BONN, CONCLUDED THAT IF THE AMERICANS DECIDED AFTER THE JANUARY MEETING THAT THEY WANTED A SUMMIT THEY SHOULD GO AHEAD SOON. HE EMPHASISED BREZHNEV'S LIMITED CONCENTRATION SPAN - AT ONE STAGE IN A MEETING HE HAD APPARENTLY COMPLAINED TO GROMYKO THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND A POINT AND THAT HIS HEAD WAS SPINNING - AND GENSCHER ASKED HIMSELF WHETHER BREZHNEV WAS NOT NOW OPEN TO INFLUENCE BY THOSE SELECTING THE PAPERS WHICH WERE PUT TO HIM).

IN CONCLUSION, FINALLY, HAIG CONCLUDED FROM HIS SEPTEMBER MEETING WITH GROMYKO, FROM HIS SUBSEQUENT TALKS WITH DOBRYNIN AND FROM THE EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES BETWEEN REAGAN AND BREZHNEV THAT THE TONE WAS GOOD AND VERY MUCH IN FAVOUR OF DIALOGUE AND A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RUSSIANS HAD SHOWN NO GIVE ON POINTS TO WHICH THE AMERICANS ATTACHED IMPORTANCE.

2. LORD CARRINGTON SAID HE HOPED THAT HAIG AND GROMYKO WOULD MEET ON A REGULAR BASIS IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DIALOGUE EXISTED. SUMMITS WERE A DIFFERENT MATTER AND WOULD NEED CAREFUL PREPARATION; DID THE AMERICANS THINK ONE FEASIBLE OR DESIRABLE IN THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS? HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HAIG WOULD USE HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS WHAT THE AMERICANS SAW AS THE LIMITS OF ACCEPTABLE ACTIVITY. IN RETROSPECT, THE LACK OF SUCH A CLEAR SIGNAL MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOVIET INVASTION OF AFGHANISTAN. IN RESPONSE, HAIG SPOKE OF FURTHER MEETINGS BETWEEN HIM AND GROMYKO AS INEVITABLE AND STRONGLY ENDORSED THE POINT ABOUT CLEAR SIGNALS. HE EXPRESSED SOME UNEASE AT THE WAY IN WHICH PUBLIC OPINION (AND THE RUSSIANS) FORCED ARMS CONTROL IN TO THE CENTRE OF US/SOVIET DISCUSSION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO CONCENTRATE ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH WERE REAL THREATS TO THE PEACE. HE IMPLIED THAT PROGRESS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE ON QUESTIONS WHERE NO LOSS OF FACE WAS INVOLVED FOR THE RUSSIANS, AND CITED CUBANS IN ANGOLA AS A PRIME EXAMBLE. ON SUMMITRY, HAIG SEEMED RELUCTANT TO ANSWER BUT EVENTUALLY SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE PROSPECTS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE OUT-COME RATHER THAN ANY PARTICULAR TIME-SCALE AND WERE LOOKING FOR THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY WHEN SUCH PROSPECTS MIGHT BE REALISABLE.

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