

Middle East

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES

17
x 18

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
~~SIR J BULLARD~~
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/... ..

NR HANNAY

NO 10 DOWNING STREET

CABINET OFFICE D10

NR GOODALL CABINET OFFICE

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2951 OF 19 JULY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON JEDDA BEIRUT TEL AVIV
AMMAN DAMASCUS CAIRO

INFO PRIORITY ROME PARIS BONN

INFO SAVING BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG
ATHENS UKDEL NATO

MINISTERIAL POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING 19 JULY
MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY

1. VAN AGT AND GENSCHER REPORTED ON THEIR RECENT VISITS TO
THE MIDDLE EAST, EMPHASIZING THE DEGREE OF CONCERN FELT BY
KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK. CHEYSSON SPOKE AT LENGTH
ON CURRENT FRENCH POLICY. ON GENSCHER'S SUGGESTION, OLESEN

ON CURRENT FRENCH POLICY. ON GENSCHER'S SUGGESTION, OLESEN AGREED TO INSTITUTE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENCY AND JORDAN AND EGYPT TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. PRESIDENCY TO REPORT BACK ON THIS TO POLITICAL DIRECTORS ON 9 SEPTEMBER.

DETAIL

2. MEETING HELD IN THE MARGINS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL. OLESEN (PRESIDENCY) EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD BEEN CONVENED BECAUSE OF THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO ENABLE GENSCHER AND VAN AGT TO REPORT ON THEIR RECENT VISITS.

3. VAN AGT (WHO HAD VISITED ONLY CAIRO) SAID THAT IN HIS TALK WITH MUBARAK THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- A) ARAB PUBLIC OPINION WAS INCREASINGLY ANTI-AMERICAN BECAUSE OF U S SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELIS. BUT A SOLUTION COULD ONLY BE FOUND WITH U S COOPERATION, AND THE COMMUNITY COULD ONLY MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IN COLLABORATION WITH THE AMERICANS.
- B) IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO SPLIT UP THE PLO. UNLESS A PROPER POLITICAL SOLUTION WERE FOUND PALESTINIANS WOULD RESORT INCREASINGLY TO TERRORISM. WEST EUROPEANS AMONG OTHERS WOULD BE THE VICTIMS.
- C) DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD A PALESTINIAN FORCE OF SOME 2,000 - 3,000 SHOULD BE STATIONED IN N. LEBANON, UNDER LEBANESE ARMY CONTROL.
- D) THIS PRE-SUPPOSED THE RE-CREATION OF A FREE AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON, WHICH IN TURN INVOLVED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY SCATHING ABOUT THE LATTER.
- E) UNIFIL WOULD HAVE A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. IT SHOULD HAVE A STRENGTHENED MANDATE, MORE TROOPS AND OPERATE THROUGHTOUT THE COUNTRY.
- F) MUBARAK HAD AT NO STAGE SPOKEN OF A PALESTINIAN "STATE". RATHER HE HAD USED THE WORD "HOMELAND" OR REFERRED TO FULL AUTONOMY.

4. GENSCHER (WHO HAD VISITED AMMAN FROM 13-14 JULY AND CAIRO FROM 15-16 JULY) REPORTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD SAID THAT THE

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

5. POINTS MADE TO GENSCHER BY MUBARAK NOT ALREADY COVERED BY VAN AGT WERE,

- A) A REFUGE FOR THE PALESTINIANS WAS IMPORTANT. BUT HE HAD REFUSED TO OFFER THIS HIMSELF SINCE THIS WOULD OPEN EGYPT TO THE ACCUSATION OF ACTING AS A LACKEY OF THE AMERICANS AND OF A "CAMP DAVID CONSPIRACY".
- B) THE AMERICANS WANTED BASES IN THE AREA; BUT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY SUICIDAL FOR ANY ARAB REGIME TO OFFER THESE.
- C) LIKE KING HUSSEIN, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS BACKING IRAN IN THE GULF. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET ARMS WERE ALSO BEING SUPPLIED THROUGH N. KOREA (AN ALLEGATION WHICH CHEYSSON SUBSEQUENTLY ENDORSED).
- D) A PITCHED BATTLE IN BEIRUT TO ANIHILATE THE PALESTINIANS WOULD BE DISASTROUS POLITICALLY; IT WOULD MERELY LEAD TO THE EXTREME ELEMENTS ASSUMING CONTROL AND, AS HE HAD EMPHASISED TO VAN AGT, AN INCREASE IN INTER-NATIONAL TERRORISM.
- E) HE HOPED TO PRODUCE A PLAN FOR A SETTLEMENT. THE KEY ELEMENT WOULD BE TO PROVIDE SOME HOPE TO THE PALESTINIANS, WHO HAD NOW SHOWN THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE.
- F) THE TIME HAD COME TO PUSH FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO (GENSCHER HERE COMMENTED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN LESS SPECIFIC ON THIS POINT).

6. GENSCHER DESCRIBED MUBARAK AND HUSSEIN AS SPEAKING OF EACH OTHER IN GLOWING TERMS AND AS IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE SAUDIS. EGYPT WAS BACK IN THE ARAB CAMP. BOTH HEADS OF STATE WANTED A SUMMIT, BUT ONE THAT MUST BE PROPERLY PREPARED. BOTH WERE SERIOUSLY WORRIED BY THE THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF MODERATE REGIMES. HE (GENSCHER) HAD BEEN STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT MUBARAK HAD OPENED THEIR JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE IN ARABIC RATHER THAN IN ENGLISH, AS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. THIS INDICATED HOW SERIOUSLY MUBARAK TOOK THE NEED TO WOO ARAB PUBLIC OPINION.

7. GENSCHER CONCLUDED THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CONCERNS OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION, SHOULD EXERCISE WHAT INFLUENCE IT COULD OVER THE AMERICANS AND SHOULD NOT (NOT) GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO ACHIEVE PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT IN A VACUUM. THE PRESIDENCY SHOULD MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ARAB MODERATES.

8. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR RAISED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR ALL REGIMES IN THE AREA. THERE WAS THE DANGER OF A BROADER SHI'ITE-SUNNI CONFLICT AND OF FUNDAMENTALIST PASSIONS BEING UNLEASHED AS FAR AFIELD AS ALGERIA. HE DID NOT AGREE WITH EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN VIEWS, AS REPORTED BY GENSCHER, THAT THE SOVIER UNION WAS WHOLLY ON IRAN'S SIDE; THE RUSSIANS WERE PROVIDING ARMS TO BOTH SIDES. FRANCE HAD GOOD REASON TO KNOW THAT THE IRAQI ARMY HAD A VERY CONSIDERABLE INITIAL ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF; IT WAS NOT SURPRISING THAT INITIAL IRANIAN ATTACKS HAD PROVED VERY COSTLY. BUT IF THE IRANIANS PERSISTED THEY WOULD SUBMERGE THE IRAQIS.

9. ON THE LEBANON CHEYSSON RESTATED RECENT FRENCH POLICY AT SOME LENGTH, EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. WEST BEIRUT WAS IN ANY CASE SO HEAVILY FORTIFIED THAT IT COULD NOT BE TAKEN IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS HEAVY FIGHTING. FRANCE WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE TROOPS IF THE RIGHT CONDITIONS WERE MET. THE RUSSIANS HAD SO FAR BEEN PASSIVE, BUT WISHED AT ALL COSTS TO AVOID A U S FORCE BEING SENT TO BEIRUT. THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE WAS NOW SUPPORTED BY ALL ARAB COUNTRIES.

10. MR HURD SAID THAT THE UK WERE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE AMERICANS AND URGING THEM TO OPEN UP TO THE GREATEST DEGREE POSSIBLE THE LINK BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN QUESTIONS. IN PARTICULAR WE WERE URGING THAT A HOME SHOULD BE FOUND IN EGYPT FOR THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP (AS OPPOSED TO ARMED FORCES, ON WHICH WE HAD HEARD MUBARAK'S VIEWS). THIS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE RE-OPENING OF SENSIBLE

MOBARAK'S VIEWS). THIS WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE RE-OPENING OF SERIOUS
DISCUSSION ON PALESTINE. SO FAR HOWEVER THE U S HAD NOT
REACTED POSITIVELY. HE AGREED ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GULF WAR.
ALTHOUGH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WAS NOT AT PRESENT INTENDING TO
ASK PALME TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE IRANIANS
SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE AVAILABLE. WE
WERE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE GULF MODERATES, WHO WANTED TO KEEP OPEN
THE DOOR TO IRAN AND WERE ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF
SUPER-POWER CONFRONTATION. WE WERE TRYING TO REASSURE THE STATES
CONCERNED. OTHERS IN THE TEN WOULD SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE.

11. COLOMBO SUGGESTED THAT THE MOMENT HAD COME FOR THE COMMUNITY,
PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, TO EXERCISE PRESSURE ON BOTH IRAN AND
IRAQ AND AGREED ON THE NEED TO REASSURE THE GULF STATES. ITALY,
LIKE FRANCE, WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE
UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS.

12. SUMMARISING THE DISCUSSION, OLESEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENCY
WOULD FOLLOW UP GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL THAT THEY SHOULD MAKE CONTACT
WITH EGYPT AND JORDAN TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING
SOLUTIONS TO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, AND WOULD REPORT TO POLITICAL
DIRECTORS ON 9 SEPTEMBER. IN CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS, THE
PRESIDENCY WOULD REFER TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE,
EMPHASIZE THAT THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST
BEIRUT COULD NOT BE SETTLED IN ISOLATION, THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS
A SOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS ESSENTIAL, AND THAT
IF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS WERE OVERLOOKED FURTHER RADICALISATION COULD
OCCUR. SUPPORT WOULD BE REITERATED FOR THE FRENCH-EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE
AND SERIOUS CONCERN EXPRESSED AT THE RECENT ESCALATION OF FIGHTING
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

FCO ADVANCE TO:

FCO - PS/SOFS PS/MR HURD MR T MOBERLLEY SIR J BULLARD NENAD

CAB - GOODALL

FCO PASS SAVING:

COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE DUBLIN LUXEMBOURG ATHENS

BUTLER

NNNN