

IMMEDIATE

PS
PS/MR HURD
PS/PUS
SIR J LEAHY
MR MOBERLY
SIR J BULLARD
HD/NENAD
HD/MED
HD/UND
HD/SEC DEPT
HD/..NAD.. ...

~~NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~

CABINET OFFICE D10

HD/CONSULAR DEPT

... ..
... ..

PUSD (2)
NEWS D
RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMMAN 141000Z SEP 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 377 OF 13 SEP

INFO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI (FOR PS/MR HURD) WASHINGTON

PRIORITY BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, MOSCOW, RABAT,
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEWYOR.

INFO SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS

FEZ SUMMIT

1. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN SAW THE US AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 11 SEPTEMBER AND ASKED HIM TO CONVEY A MESSAGE TO THE US ADMINISTRATION CONCERNING THE FEZ SUMMIT MEETING SEMICLN THE MESSAGE WAS BASED ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHICH THE CROWN PRINCE HAD HAD WITH KING HUSSEIN FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT MEETING AND QUOTES THE KING DIRECTLY IN A NUMBER OF PLACES. FOLLOWING WERE ITS MAIN POINTS:

A. THE AMERICANS WERE URGED NOT TO REGARD THE SUMMIT'S CONCLUSIONS AS A RIPOSTE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE EVEN THOUGH THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH WERE SOVIET SURROGATES, SYRIA, SOUTH YEMEN, ALGERIA, AND MAURITANIA, MIGHT TRY TO PORTRAY IT AS SUCH.

B. FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE PALESTINIANS HAD BEEN LEFT TO BE WORKED OUT 'WITHIN THE ARAB FAMILY.' ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND MIGHT PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR A REFERENDUM IN WHICH THOSE CONCERNED WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE THEIR

REACHED WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND MIGHT PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR A REFERENDUM IN WHICH THOSE CONCERNED WOULD BE FREE TO MAKE THEIR CHOICE. NONE (REPEAT NONE) OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SUMMIT MEETING, WHETHER MODERATE OR OTHERWISE, HAD GIVEN THE LEAST INDICATION THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO SET ASIDE THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE RABAT SUMMIT OF 1974 CONCERNING THE PALESTINIANS (IE TO ALLOW THE JORDANIANS TO NEGOTIATE ON THEIR BEHALF) SEMICLN THIS HAD LIMITED JORDANIAN ABILITY TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD. ARAFAT'S CONDUCT AT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN THAT OF A WEAK AND FRIGHTENED MAN WHO WAS NOT HIS OWN MASTER: HE APPEARED TO HAVE LEARNED NOTHING FROM RECENT EVENTS.

C. THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON HAD BEEN ADDRESSED IN A MANNER WHICH SPELT BOTH IMMEDIATE AND LONGER-TERM DISASTER FOR ARAB INTERESTS. THIS HAD BEEN DUE TO A MIXTURE OF SYRIAN PRESSURE, ARAFAT'S POWERLESSNESS AND THE 'UNYIELDING AND LEGITIMATE LEBANESE ATTITUDE.' IN KING HUSSEIN'S VIEW 'THE DIE WAS CAST' FOR LEBANON SEMICLN HE RECALLED IN THIS CONTEXT THE TRAGIC EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN JORDAN IN 1970. IN TACKLING THE PROBLEMS OF LEBANON, JORDAN HAD WORKED IN UNISON WITH MOROCCO, TUNISIA, IRAQ AND SUDAN SEMICLN THE SAUDIS HAD BEEN UNSURE OF THEMSELVES AND OBSCURE SEMICLN THEY HAD SECRETLY PROMISED SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO SYRIA.

D. ON THE RENEWAL OF ARAB TIES WITH EGYPT, JORDAN, IRAQ, SUDAN AND MOROCCO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN HEATED EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIET SURROGATES. KING HUSSEIN HAD GIVEN THE SUMMIT AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONTACTS HE HAD HAD WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND HAD AFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO CONTINUE THESE UNTIL THE TIME CAME FOR THE RESTORATION OF FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

E. NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA ON THE ONE HAND AND JORDAN AND IRAQ ON THE OTHER (CF THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S PUBLIC COMMENTS QUOTED IN MY TELNO 375).

F. NO NEW FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR JORDAN HAD BEEN OFFERED AT THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE SEMICLN EVEN THE PROMISE MADE AT THE AMMAN SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER 1980 TO MAKE GOOD THE PAYMENTS DUE FROM ALGERIA AND LIBYA UNDER THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT AGREEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN RENEWED.

G. SUMMING UP HIS VIEWS ON THE MEETING, KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBED IT AS 'THE MOST TAXING AND FRUSTRATING SUMMIT HE HAD EVER ATTENDED, DESPITE SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS WHICH FELL FAR SHORT OF HIS HOPES.'

FOR THIS HE BLAMED IN PARTICULAR THE VICIOUS CONDUCT OF THE SYRIANS AND ALSO THE GENERALLY COWARDLY AND AMBIGUOUS PERFORMANCE OF THE ARAB MODERATES SEMICLN THE KUWAITIS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN NEGATIVE ON MOST ISSUES AND SAUDI CONDUCT HAD BEEN UNCLEAR AND AMBIVALENT.

H. KING HUSSEIN FELT THAT A COMPLETE REASSESSMENT WAS NOW REQUIRED OF JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND THEIR FUTURE CONDUCT. SUCCESS WOULD DEPEND ON HIS ABILITY TO 'MOBILISE AND ORGANISE THE MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE' AND ON 'THE READINESS OF OUR FRIENDS TO PROVIDE US WITH THE MEANS TO AUGMENT OUR CAPABILITIES TO FACE THESE CHALLENGES.'

THESE CHALLENGES.''

2. MUCH OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE MESSAGE IS, AS USUAL IN THESE COMMUNICATIONS, RATHER OBSCURE (INDEED THE TEXT AMBASSADOR VIETS WAS ORIGINALLY ASKED TO DELIVER BY THE CROWN PRINCE WAS SO CONVOLUTED IN ITS PHRASING THAT AMBASSADOR VIETS HAD TO ASK FOR A REVISED VERSION AND PRINCE HASSAN HAD A FURTHER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH KING HUSSEIN BEFORE DELIVERING THE FINAL TEXT). IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE CROWN PRINCE, VIETS WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION ON SOME POINTS. ACCORDING TO THE CROWN PRINCE, KING HUSSEIN HAD REPEATEDLY STATED ON THE TELEPHONE THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE RESULTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT HE INTENDED TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION HE HAD OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN (PRESUMABLY WHEN VELIOTES AND VIETS PAID THEIR SECRET VISIT TO AMMAN IN LATE AUGUST). KING HUSSEIN AND KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO WOULD TOGETHER HAVE TO TRY TO DEVELOP A JORDANIAN FRAMEWORK ON WHICH JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE BASED (SEE PARAGRAPH 1.B ABOVE). IN TALKING TO PRINCE HASSAN, KING HUSSEIN HAD APPARENTLY REPEATEDLY SPOKEN OF ARAFAT'S GUTLESSNESS AND DUPLICITY. THE KING HAD ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT CAUTION ABOUT POSSIBLE JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMMISSION NOMINATED BY THE SUMMIT TO VISIT WASHINGTON. HE WANTED TO KEEP A FREE HAND TO ACT IN JORDAN'S BEST INTERESTS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND NOT BE TIED BY THE DECISIONS OR TACTICS ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION SEMICLN HE WOULD WELCOME US ADVICE ON WHETHER JORDAN SHOULD JOIN THE COMMISSION OR NOT.

3. KING HUSSEIN ALSO SPOKE OF HIS DEEP REGRET THAT THE SOVIET SURROGATES HAD WON THE DAY IN REJECTING THE READMISSION OF EGYPT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. HE BLAMED THE FAILURE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON STEPS TO BRING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR TO AN END ON SYRIA'S 'ENDLESS MANOEUVRING ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET UNION.'

KING HUSSEIN THOUGHT THE SYRIANS AND RUSSIANS WERE CALCULATING ON AN IRANIAN VICTORY AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE IRAQI REGIME WITHIN TWO MONTHS. THE KING HAD CASTIGATED SAUDI PERFORMANCE AT THE SUMMIT AS COWARDLY AND TWO-FACED AND HAD TOLD PRINCE HASSAN THAT HE HAD ALMOST TORPEDOED THE SUMMIT BY WALKING OUT AND FREEZING JORDAN'S TIES WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE. HE HAD BEEN RESTRAINED FROM DOING SO ONLY BY HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH KING HASSAN AND THE DAMAGE SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE DONE TO JORDANIAN/MOROCCAN RELATIONS.

4. THE KING HAD ALSO REAFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO CONDUCT A COMPLETE REASSESSMENT OF HIS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD FOLLOWING WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE SUMMIT 'FIASCO' AND, IF NEED BE, TO GO IT ALONE IN FOLLOWING UP PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. BUT IF HE DECIDED TO DO SO HE WOULD NEED FAR MORE MATERIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT FROM THE US THAN HE WAS OBTAINING AT PRESENT. PRINCE HASSAN HAD ENDED BY URGING VIETS TO ARRANGE FOR A QUICK MESSAGE OF SUPPORT TO BE SENT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN, CLAIMING THAT THE KING WAS DETERMINED TO PROCEED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US AND THAT

TO BE SENT FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING HUSSEIN, CLAIMING THAT THE KING WAS DETERMINED TO PROCEED IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE VITAL FOR HIM TO GET A STRONG AND CLEAR SIGNAL OF US BACKING AND ADMIRATION FOR HIS STAND. IN HIS REPORTING TELEGRAM VIETS ADDED HIS OWN PLEAS TO THOSE OF PRINCE HASSAN FOR SUCH A MESSAGE.

5. PRINCE HASSAN ALSO BRIEFED THE HEAD OF THE EGYPTIAN INTERESTS SECTION AND THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS JOINTLY (THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS NOT AVAILABLE AND I HAD NOT YET RETURNED) ON HIS MESSAGE TO THE AMERICANS. THE BRIEFING GIVEN TO THE GERMAN AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS WAS IN EVEN STRONGER AND MORE EMOTIVE TERMS THAT THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE FINALLY SENT BY VIETS AND MAY HAVE BEEN BASED ON THE EARLIER VERSION OF THE MESSAGE. BUT THE MAIN POINTS WERE THE SAME AS IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE.

QQ6. FOR THE MOMENT KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ARE ONLY REACHING US THROUGH THE CROWN PRINCE, BASED ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND IN A VERSION INTENDED FOR AMERICAN EYES, ONE OF THE KING'S OBJECTIVES BEING TO FIND OUT WHAT ADDITIONAL US SUPPORT, BOTH POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL, MIGHT BE AVAILABLE IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO GO IT VIRTUALLY ALONE. HE IS CLEARLY ANXIOUS TO LET THE AMERICANS KNOW THAT HE IS NOT WAVERING IN HIS DETERMINATION TO MAKE THE MOST OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. HE ALSO TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE IN HIS INTERVIEW ON PANORAMA, OF WHICH I ASSUME YOU HAVE THE FULL TEXT. SIMILAR VIEWS ARE BEING EXPRESSED HERE BY ABU ODEH, THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER, WHO IS PRIVATELY SAYING THAT THE US INITIATIVE IS THE ARAB'S LAST CHANCE TO RECOVER THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. BUT THIS VIEW IS HOTELY DISPUTED IN, FOR EXAMPLE, AN EDITORIAL IN THIS MORNING'S LOCAL ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILY AND, AS SOON AS THE KING RETURNS TO AMMAN, HE IS LIKELY TO BE EXPOSED TO OTHER COUNSELS. HIS OWN INNATE CAUTION MAY ALSO INCLINE HIM, ONCE THE DUST HAS SETTLED AND HIS IMMEDIATE ANGER OVER THE PROCEEDINGS AT FEZ HAS RECEDED, TO HIS TRADITIONAL RELUCTANCE TO BREAK RANKS WITH THE OTHER ARABS. YOU WILL HAVE NOTED HIS REMARKS IN HIS PANORAMA INTERVIEW THAT "I AM GOING TO PLAY A VERY ACTIVE PART IN HELPING... THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE BUT, BEYOND THAT, THERE ARE LIMITATIONS WHICH I RECOGNISE AND WHICH I HOPE THE WORLD RECOGNISES."

7. SINCE THE ABOVE WAS DRAFTED I HAVE SEEN CROWN PRINCE HASSAN MYSELF (WITH ONLY THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO LONDON PRESENT) AND HE READ OVER TO ME MOST OF HIS MESSAGE TO THE AMERICANS. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO ARRANGE WITH KING HUSSEIN, WHO RETURNS TO AMMAN THIS EVENING, FOR MR HURD TO PAY AN EARLY VISIT TO AMMAN: MR HURD WILL THEREFORE SHORTLY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE KING'S VIEWS AT FIRST HAND. OTHERWISE THE CROWN PRINCE HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO WHAT I HAVE REPORTED ABOVE. HE REPEATED HIS BELIEF IN THE SINCERITY AND COURAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, SAID WHAT A DISAPPOINTMENT KING FAHD HAD BEEN AT FEZ (AT THE KEY POINT IN THE DISCUSSION ON ARAB RELATIONS

COURAGE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN, SAID WHAT A DISAPPOINTMENT KING FAHD HAD BEEN AT FEZ (AT THE KEY POINT IN THE DISCUSSION ON ARAB RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, FAHD HAD CALLED FOR AN ADJOURNMENT FOR FOOD AND SLEEP) AND SAID THAT AMERICAN/JORDANIAN DISCUSSIONS TO ELABORATE A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTION (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE) WOULD NEED TO BE PURSUED IN A ''SMALLER, LIKE-MINDED CLUB'' (IMPLYING THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE HOPING TO INVOLVE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AS WELL).

8. ALTHOUGH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN HAS NOW TOLD ME OF THE US/JORDANIAN EXCHANGES DIRECTLY, THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES ARE HOLDING THIS EXERCISE VERY CLOSELY AND AMBASSADOR VIETS' OWN REPORTING TELEGRAM WAS COPIED TO 2 OR 3 POSTS ''FOR AMBASSADORS' EYES ONLY.'' I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, IF WE COULD AVOID REVEALING TO AMERICAN POSTS OVERSEAS JUST HOW FULLY VIETS IS KEEPING US IN THE PICTURE.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES

URWICK

NNNN

N