

ADVANCE COPY

PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR J LEAHY  
~~MR MOBBLEY~~ *M Egan*  
SIR J BULLARD  
HD/NENAD  
HD/MED  
HD/UND  
HD/SEC DEPT  
HD/... ..  
HD/CONSULAR DEPT  
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CONFIDENTIAL

FROM AMMAN 131715Z OCT 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 426 OF 13 OCT 1982

AND TO INFO ROUTINE BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JEDDA, RABAT,  
TEL AVIV, TUNIS, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND CG JERUSALEM.

AND SAVING TO OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MY TELNO 423: JORDAN/PLC.

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN EARLY THIS AFTERNOON, A FEW HOURS AFTER ARAFAT'S DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN. HE BEGAN BY HANDING ME A LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT (TEXT IN MIFT) TOGETHER WITH A FOLDER CONTAINING COPIES OF HIS EXCHANGES WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN BETWEEN 14 JUNE AND 11 OCTOBER ( WHICH THROW MUCH INTERESTING LIGHT ON THE ORIGINS OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH A GOOD DEAL OF THE GROUND HAS ALREADY BEEN COVERED IN OUR EARLIER REPORTING). I PROPOSE SENDING THE ORIGINAL OF THE KINGS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE OTHER DOCUMENTS BY CASUAL COURIER TO REACH THE FCO ON 17 OCTOBER (ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE SEPARATELY WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT).

WILL BE MADE SEPARATELY WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT). I AM HOWEVER TELEGRAPHING IN FULL (MY SECOND AND THIRD IFTS TO THE FCO AND WASHINGTON ONLY) SPEAKING NOTES LEFT WITH THE KING BY THE US AMBASSADOR HERE ON 4 OCTOBER, SETTING OUT US DESIDERATA FOR HIS TALKS WITH THE PLO, AND KING HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS ON THEM IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN DATED 11 OCTOBER, AS THESE ARE OF IMMEDIATE RELEVANCE TO KING HUSSEIN'S TALKS WITH ARAFAT.

2. KING HUSSEIN MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO ME ON HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT. HE FELT THESE HAD GONE WELL AND REPRESENTED A GOOD START. THEY HAD GOT TO KNOW EACH OTHER MUCH BETTER SEMICOLON INDEED THERE HAD NOT BEEN SUCH FRANK EXCHANGES BETWEEN THEM FOR A VERY LONG TIME. AS HE HAD SAID IN HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER, HE HAD CONCENTRATED ON TWO MAIN THEMES ON WHICH HE FELT PROGRESS MUST BE MADE SOON:

A) THAT ARAFAT SHOULD COME OUT WITH A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST WITHIN HER 1967 BORDERS, GOING BEYOND ANY OF HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS OR THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE FEZ SUMMIT SEMICOLON

B) DEFINITION OF THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PALESTINE AND JORDAN.

IF PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS COULD BE HANDLED AS A FAMILY MATTER BETWEEN THEMSELVES, THEY WOULD BE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES.

3. THE KING SAID HE HAD TOLD ARAFAT THAT A CLEAR STATEMENT OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST FROM THE PLO WOULD BE OF IMMENSE HELP NOT ONLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMERICANS, BUT ALSO IN ENABLING FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE US. THE AMERICANS HAD SAID THAT THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A STATEMENT WAS THE ONLY OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF A US-PLO DIALOGUE. IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE AMERICANS WERE BLUFFING, THEN THEIR BLUFF SHOULD BE CALLED. KING HUSSEIN THOUGHT HE HAD MADE SOME IMPACT ON ARAFAT.

4. ARAFAT HAD ALSO AGREED THAT SOME FORM OF UNITY BETWEEN JORDAN AND PALESTINE WAS THE ONLY SENSIBLE FOUNDATION ON WHICH TO BUILD. IT HAD THEREFORE BEEN LEFT THAT ARAFAT WOULD ARRANGE FOR A PLO DELEGATION TO RETURN TO JORDAN SOON FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME THAT HIS CONCEPT OF A FUTURE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDAN AND PALESTINE WAS TWO SEPARATE "UNITS" EACH PRESERVING ITS OWN IDENTITY AND

SEPARATE UNITS, EACH PRESERVING ITS OWN IDENTITY AND HAVING ITS OWN ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, BUT JOINED TOGETHER IN SOME FORM OF UNION WITH A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY. IT MIGHT EVEN IN DUE COURSE FORM THE NUCLEUS FOR A WIDER ARAB UNITY, WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES COULD JOIN.

5. THE KING EMPHASISED THAT, WHILE HE AND ARAFAT HAD AGREED ON THE PATH THEY SHOULD PURSUE, THEY HAD ALSO RECOGNISED THAT THEY FACED FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION NOTABLY FROM SYRIA AND ISRAEL AND THAT IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO ACT WITH GREAT CAUTION AND TO SAY AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE

PUBLICLY ABOUT HOW THEY INTENDED TO PROCEED. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, THE KING TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT ARAFAT WOULD PROBABLY KEEP HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TUNIS FOR THE TIME BEING. IT WAS NECESSARY GRADUALLY TO BUILD UP TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PLO AND THE JORDANIANS, BUT THE KING DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PLO MIGHT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE TRANSFER THEIR HEADQUARTERS TO JORDAN SEMICOLON HE READILY ADMITTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE POPULAR WITH EAST BANKERS, WHOSE MEMORIES OF THE EVENTS OF 1970 WERE STILL FRESH.

HE MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT ABU JIHAD (KHALIL AL WAZIR, ARAEITS RIGHT HAND MAN ON THE FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND HEAD OF THE MILITARY WING OF FATAH) WOULD BE ALLOWED AS AN EXCEPTION TO SETTLE IN AMMAN IMMEDIATELY, AS HE WAS IN ACUTE DANGER FROM THE SYRIANS.

KB6. KING HUSSEIN SAID THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF HIS TALKS WITH ARAFAT HAD BEEN TO TRY TO CONVINCHE HIM THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN EARNEST AND THAT ARAFAT AND THE PLO WERE NOT BEING ASKED TO RUN VERY HIGH RISKS TO NO PURPOSE. THE KING SAID HE HAD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, DARED TELL ARAFAT THE CONTENTS OF THE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION LEFT WITH HIM BY THE US AMBASSADOR ON 4 OCTOBER (TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT) LEST HE DISCOURAGE HIM COMPLETELY. THE KING EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF TRYING TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO MAKE SOME MOVE TOWARDS THE PLO IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE THEM ON THE RIGHT PATH.

7. I ASKED THE KING ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER ARABS. HE SAID THE SAUDIS (WHO SENT PRINCE BANDAR HERE DURING THE KINGS TALKS WITH ARAFAT-SEE MY TELNO 417 ) WERE BEING QUITE HELPFUL AND HE WAS ALSO BEING GIVEN EXCELLENT SUPPORT BY IRAQ SEMICOLON PRESIDENT SADDAM HAD URGED ARAFAT STRONGLY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE. I ASKED THE KING WHAT THE LATEST NEWS WAS ON THE FEZ FOLLOW UP COMMISSION. HE SAID HE NOW UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE LEADING A DELEGATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

NOW UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HASSAN WOULD BE LEADING A DELEGATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION TO WASHINGTON ON 22 OCTOBER AND THAT THEY WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE VISITING LONDON (THIS IS AT VARIANCE WITH WHAT HE SAYS IN HIS LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER). THE KING SEEMED VERY SCEPTICAL OF THE VALUE OF THE EXERCISE, BUT EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT AT LEAST HE PERSONALLY MIGHT NOT NOW BE INVOLVED AND WOULD THEREFORE BE FREE TO PURSUE WHAT HE FELT WAS THE MORE IMPORTANT TASK OF TRYING TO CONCERT HIS POLICY FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WITH THE PLO.

8. I AM HOPING TO SEE OTHER JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS OVER THE NEXT DAY OR TWO, AND WILL THEN BE BETTER PLACED TO OFFER A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT. BUT THE KING CLEARLY WANTED US TO KNOW THAT HE FELT HE HAD DONE AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED IN THE OPENING ROUND OF WHAT WOULD INEVITABLY BE A DRAWN OUT PROCESS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

URWICK

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