



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

Agree

- (1) that the Saudis should be informed in terms of the attached telegram ^{Yes}

27 October 1982

- (2) that I should tell all involved that nothing further (informing the U.S., the Saudis etc.) without your being consulted?

Dear John,

Yes mt A.J.C. $\frac{25}{10}$

It was probably inevitable that we would have to give the Saudis an idea of what was afoot soon (since they would almost certainly find out in due course from the Yemenis, and since they regard the Yemen as very much their patch). They can be expected to welcome the assistance we are offering. The constraint on doing so at first was that the Yemenis wished to keep it under their hat. But the Ambassador in Sana'a has now reported that the Yemenis themselves have asked the Saudis for financial help with in-country costs (we are paying only capitulation costs).

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary believes that we should now act ourselves quickly at the highest level with the Saudis, in the first place to impress on them the need for secrecy, but also to ensure that they do not get a garbled message, and that we get credit for the assistance we are giving.

We would not mention the possibility of subsequent joint operations as part of this training.

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Passages deleted and retained under Section 3(4)

(W)Wayland
23 May 2014



SECRET AND PERSONAL

The Head of the Saudi Military Mission in Sana'a has told Mr Walker that he thinks the Saudis may be prepared to help the Yemenis with finance (though we need not press them on this): he has advised that we have a word anyway with the Minister of Defence, Prince Sultan. Mr Walker believes that we should also speak to the Head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki (this is probably advisable on grounds of speed alone, as it may take time for the Embassy in Jedda to secure an appointment with Prince Sultan.)

It may also be necessary to put the Americans in the picture at some stage, because they are likely to find out anyway, and because of our shared interest and involvement in defence matters in the Arabian Peninsula. Mr Walker favours informing them now and also speaking to his German colleague. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary takes the view that we should not inform the Germans and should only tell the Americans at a high level in Washington on a very restricted basis.

Criticism, in particular from radical Arab states, could be expected. Our public position would be that we were providing limited military training to the YAR but we would not comment on the type of training or the British unit involved. We believed that we would be able to hold this line, not only in the initial training period, but also during joint operations (phase 3 of the proposal), when

The operational phase is still some months away and although it is fully accepted that if this phase did not go ahead the training phases would be much less worthwhile, there will be an opportunity to look at the risks again before it is launched.

Passages deleted and
retained under Section 3(4) /FCO

Chayland

23 May 2014

SECRET AND PERSONAL



SECRET AND PERSONAL

FCO officials have kept in close touch on these questions with their MOD counterparts, who are in agreement with the proposed action with the Saudis. Mr Pym accordingly believes that instructions should be sent immediately to Jedda on the lines of the enclosed draft telegram.

I am copying this to Nick Evans (MOD), who may have views on the desirability of informing the Americans.

Your ever
John Holmes

(J E Holmes)

Private Secretary

A J Coles Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET AND PERSONAL