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M.I.P.T.

FUTURE OF HONG KONG: SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS - WORKING  
PAPER ON FUTURE SECURITY.

BEGINS

DRAFT SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS  
THE FUTURE SECURITY OF HONG KONG

THE PROBLEM

1. THE SECURITY ISSUE HAS COME TO THE FORE EARLIER THAN ANTICIPATED BECAUSE THE CHINESE HAVE NOW INDICATED THEIR INTENTION TO STATION MAINLAND FORCES IN THE SAR. WE MUST NOW DECIDE WHAT LINE TO TAKE AT THE JANUARY 1984 ROUND OF TALKS IN RESPECT OF SECURITY FOR THE SAR. A WORKING PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHINESE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO INFLUENCE THEIR THINKING AND PRE-EMPT FURTHER UNILATERAL STATEMENTS ADVERSE TO OUR POSITION.

RECOMMENDATION

2. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A WORKING PAPER SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHINESE AS FOLLOWS:

(TEXT BEGINS)

THE CHINESE PROPOSAL

1. THERE WOULD BE A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR THE SAR, BUT NATIONAL DEFENCE WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN HONG KONG WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE REGION AND THEIR MILITARY EXPENSES WILL BE BORNE BY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. THE SAR WILL ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF KEEPING SOCIAL ORDER IN THE REGION.

IMPLICATION

2. THE BRITISH GARRISON AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUED WOULD BE WITHDRAWN.

3. TO DISCHARGE ITS OBLIGATIONS FOR "SOCIAL ORDER", WITHOUT SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, THE SAR MUST MAINTAIN ITS OWN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE. THE POLICE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER. THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE A CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES: BUT THEY WOULD NEED, AS NOW, RECOURSE TO A SECURITY FORCE TO ASSIST THEM IN DEALING WITH EMERGENCIES AND TO COUNTER ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION. AS THE SECURITY FORCE WILL HAVE A ROLE PRIMARILY LIMITED TO INTERNAL SECURITY IT WOULD BE SMALLER THAN THE PRESENT GARRISON.

IT WOULD BE LOCALLY RAISED AND MADE EFFECTIVE PRIOR TO 1997.

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PRESENTATION.

PRESENTATION OF WORKING PAPER

3. THE POINTS TO BE MADE ON HANDING OVER THE PAPER TO THE CHINESE AND WHEN IT IS INTRODUCED IN THE TALKS WOULD BE THAT THE PROPOSAL TO STATION MAINLAND FORCES IN THE SAR WOULD BE A VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE AND COULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HONG KONG WAS A PLACE TO BE OCCUPIED; EVEN A TOKEN FORCE WOULD IMPLY THAT THE SAR ENJOYED ITS HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY ON SUFFERANCE ONLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CREATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE TO SUPPORT THE POLICE, TOGETHER WITH A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT MAINLAND FORCES WILL NOT BE STATIONED IN THE SAR, WOULD CONFIRM THE INTENTION TO LEAVE UNCHANGED HONG KONG'S PRESENT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND LIFESTYLE. THE CONSIDERATIONS OF TIME AND DISTANCE WHICH HAVE CAUSED BRITISH FORCES TO HAVE TO BE STATIONED IN HONG KONG WOULD NOT APPLY TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN MEETING ITS OBLIGATIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE. IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO BE READY TO EXPAND ON THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY FORCES SHOULD THE CHINESE ASK FOR DETAILS.

THE ARGUMENT

4. WE NEED TO:

A. EXPLOIT THE OPENINGS PROVIDED BY THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SAR SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOCIAL ORDER; AND THE STATEMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS:

B. CONVINCED THE CHINESE THAT THE PROPOSAL TO STATION MAINLAND FORCES (INCLUDING WARSHIPS) IN THE SAR WILL DAMAGE CONFIDENCE AND BE AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES; AND

C. PERSUADE THEM TO OUR OWN PREFERRED LINE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME BE CLEAR ABOUT THE OPTIONS OPEN TO US IN NEGOTIATIONS IF, AS MAY WELL BE THE CASE, THEY INSIST ON STATIONING SOME FORCES TO MEET THEIR ESSENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENCE OBLIGATIONS.

OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO PERSUADE THEM OF BOTH THE ADVISABILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF THE SAR MAINTAINING ITS OWN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES ON A SCALE ADEQUATE TO HANDLE ALL SITUATIONS SHORT OF EXTERNAL ATTACK, AND THUS GIVE THE CHINESE NO EXCUSE FOR INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THIS AIM SHOULD BE COMPREHENSIBLE TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN THAT WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE SEEKING ROUGHLY THE FIRST TWO TIERS OF THEIR OWN THREE TIER SYSTEM OF POLICE, ARMED POLICE AND ARMY.

5. THERE WOULD BE NO PROSPECT OF SECURING CHINESE AGREEMENT IF WE SOUGHT TO PASS OFF ANY FORM OF BRITISH GARRISON AS PART OF THE SAR'S OWN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE. ANY SUGGESTION THAT A SECURITY FORCE MIGHT BE RECRUITED EXTERNALLY (FROM GURKHAS OR ELSEWHERE) IS UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CHINESE: IT COULD LEAD TO THE RECRUITMENT OF EXPATRIATES FROM MAINLAND CHINA; AND IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG RUNNING THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. IF, HOWEVER, WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN SECURING AGREEMENT TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE

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IT MAY THEN BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE THAT SOME BRITISH ADVISORS AND OTHER TRAINING ASSISTANCE COULD BE OF CONTINUING BENEFIT BEYOND 1997.

6. OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION SHOULD THEREFORE BE TO SEEK AGREEMENT:

A. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO THE RAISING AND TRAINING OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE PRIOR TO 1997 COUPLED TO A PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT NO MAINLAND FORCES (INCLUDING WARSHIPS) WILL BE STATIONED IN THE SAR. FAILING THAT,

B. TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE, WITH MAINLAND PRESENCE IN THE SAR RESTRICTED TO A PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (PLA) LIAISON OFFICE. AS A FALL BACK POSITION WE COULD CONCEDE A REQUIREMENT FOR A TOKEN MAINLAND PRESENCE LOCATED WELL AWAY FROM THE URBAN AREAS FOR THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSES OF NATIONAL DEFENCE: FOR EXAMPLE, EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, EARLY WARNING OR PERIODIC VISITS BY WARSHIPS.

C. FINALLY (AS THE THE VERY MINIMUM BEFORE WE RESERVE AND RECONSIDER OUR POSITION), TO A TOKEN MAINLAND PRESENCE AND A STRENGTHENED HONG KONG POLICE FORCE WITH AN EFFECTIVE CAPABILITY TO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS WITHOUT THE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE POLICE FORCE.

7. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR HMG OF AGREEING TO TUVIS NEGOTIATING POSITION ARE TWOFOLD:

A. FIRST, IT INVOLVES A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH GARRISON IN THE LATER YEARS IF AN INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE IS AGREED AND CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY IT. ALTHOUGH HMG WOULD REMAIN RESPONSIBLE IN ALL RESPECTS FOR SECURITY UP TO 1997, AND WOULD NEED TO MAINTAIN A BALANCED FORCE WITH SUFFICIENT STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY TO CATER FOR ANY INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN HONG KONG, THE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES WOULD BE WIDE. ON THE ONE HAND THE THREAT OF PRC INSPIRED DISORDER POST AN AGREEMENT WILL (SUBJECT TO ANY MAVERICK ACTION BY THE CHINESE) BE MUCH REDUCE, ON THE OTHER IF THE AGREEMENT CAUSES THE ECONOMY TO DETERIORATE THERE COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL UNREST. NEVERTHELESS IT WILL BE NECESSARY, IF THE SECURITY FORCE IS TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE WHEN THE GARRISON LEAVES, FOR IT GRADUALLY TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS ROLE (FROM THE GARRISON) BEFORE 1997. IN THIS CONNECTION THERE MAY BE ADVANTAGES IN OUR NEGOTIATORS INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF A PHASED WITHDRAWAL, BUT ONLY TO TIP THE BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF AN AGREEMENT TO OUR PREFERRED LINE.

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B. SECONDLY, IF A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS REACHED, THE PROBLEMS OF RAISING THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCE AND, AS NECESSARY, ENHANCING THE POLICE MUST BE ADDRESSED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY IF WE ARE TO ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSITION. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT IN THE TIME FRAME AVAILABLE TO RECRUIT, TRAIN AND GIVE EXPERIENCE TO THE FIRST GENERATION LEADERSHIP: THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF OTHER AGENCIES COMPETING FOR SIMILAR TALENT: SOME LOCAL CITIZENS MAY BE RELUCTANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES FOR FEAR OF COMPROMISING THEIR FUTURE AND THAT OF THEIR FAMILIES: AND THE POLICE WILL FACE PROBLEMS OVER LOCAL RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION IN AN INCREASINGLY LOCALISED FORCE. HOWEVER, IF THE TOTAL PACKAGE NEGOTIATED IS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG, AND PROVIDED THAT THE NECESSARY RESOURCES ARE MADE AVAILABLE AND AN EARLY START IS MADE, THEN THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND POLICE JUDGEMENT IS THAT REASONABLE, SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE. INDEED, IF WE ARE TO AVOID PUTTING AT RISK THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE SAR, WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GIVE A HIGH PRIORITY TO THESE TASKS IN THE COMING YEARS.

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FUTURE OF HONG KONG  
LIMITED  
HD/HKD  
HD/FED  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/PUSD  
D/HD/PUSD (MR FLOWER)  
RES.D. (MR WALKER)  
LEGAL ADVISER (SIR IAN SINCLAIR)  
PS  
PS/LADY YOUNG  
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