



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister.

Hugh Thomas has asked me whether the attached speech - which ~~will~~ George Hoban will deliver in your presence at the Hyde Park Hotel on Sunday night will embarrass you, especially in the light of your visit to Hungary.

I have marked passages on pages 4 and 5 which could, if they are picked up, be portrayed as a policy of intolerance in domestic affairs (shades of Mr. Buel in Vienna!).

I believe we should not

to the term "Thatcher
doctrine" on page 4 to be
dropped. Otherwise, we can if
necessary say that the conclusion
of the Centre for Policy Studies'
study group are not the same
thing as government policy. ●

Agree? Yes - very
much so.
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A. J. C. $\frac{30}{1}$

Draft speech
30 January 1984

The Soviet Study Group of this Centre, under the Chairmanship of Lord Thomas, has given a good deal of thought in the last year or so to a question that is central to our relationship with the USSR and its client states in Eastern Europe: Is the Soviet system what it is because the Russian people have made it so or acquiesced in making it so, or is it rather the case that the Russian people itself regards the system as alien to its character much in the same way as the Ukrainian or Latvian or Uzbek people do? This, in turn, raises the broader issue of whether Marxism-Leninism is a wholly foreign imposition, or whether it expresses some inborn reluctance or inability on the part of the Russian people to sustain a tolerant, pluralistic, democratic society.

Each of these views has its eminent spokesman both in the Western world and the Soviet Union itself. For example, Alexander Solzhenitsyn holds, and holds with passionate intensity, that the whole Marxist ideology is foreign to the spirit of the Russian people and Russian culture. Professor Richard Pipes, on the other hand, and many of his fellow-students of Russian history have shown -- and have been attacked by Solzhenitsyn for showing -- that the Soviet system is in substantial harmony with the dominant strain in Russian history and political culture -- traditions that we might, with

only slight exaggeration, describe as a lack of a sense of democratic values and a readiness to acquiesce in the will of existing authority, whatever its legitimation or provenance.

But why, you may ask, are these seemingly academic questions important for the formation of Western foreign policy?

They are important because this is the age of instant communications -- of the mobilization of mass opinion over the heads of national governments. Our informed estimate of what support the Soviet system enjoys by the people of Russia or the Ukraine or Lithuania has -- or ought to have -- a direct impact on how we identify the ends of our policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and by what means we propose to attain them.

In doing so we are, in fact, taking a leaf out of the Soviet book. The Soviet Party and government have long been familiar with the need to identify the adversary correctly, to subject it to pressure at its most vulnerable points, and to do so with a great variety of means -- above ground and underground -- under the direct supervision of the Politburo.

Fortunately for the Western world, the Soviet leaders have not always been very sophisticated in applying their own doctrine; they tended to get it wrong

more often than right. For example, their recent assessment of how much "peace" propaganda the West German public would assimilate on the eve of missile deployment, and thus prevent deployment, proved to be false. ~~[So did their hope at the time of the Falklands conflict that British public opinion would disown the policies of the government and the government itself lose its nerve. Marx and Lenin proved poor guides to the nerve of the Prime Minister.]~~

On other occasions, however, they were successful in reaching deep into our domestic affairs, or setting the context for our discomfort by manipulating third-world opinion. It will suffice to recall their masterly exploitation of the fears surrounding the neutron weapon and their gradual takeover of the United Nations as a forum of world opinion.

Our study-group has reached no dramatic conclusions, but the undramatic ones are important enough. They may be subsumed, for my present purpose, under a single heading: the need to differentiate.

It is, in one sense, still perfectly adequate to talk of the Soviet "bloc" when describing the postwar Soviet empire, because the whole of Eastern Europe continues to be under Soviet suzerainty and still carries the institutional imprint of Communism, Soviet style.

In another sense, however, the continuing revolution in Poland, the creeping dilution of the system in Hungary and its paralysis in Czechoslovakia make it

essential that we should recognize the highly individual and indeed idiosyncratic character of each East European country and shape our policies accordingly.

In doing so we must bear in mind two things. First, that we are dealing with unelected governments which are, in some ways, nevertheless sensitive to the pressures of public opinion. Second, that the peoples of Eastern Europe are our firm allies. They share our sense of freedom, democracy and national independence. They constitute, in a sense, the "Communist encirclement" of the Soviet Union.

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~~If their impact on their governments is necessarily limited, and that of their governments on Moscow more limited still, that should not discourage us from maximizing our welcome and popularity in Eastern Europe.~~

We might do worse than pit a "Thatcher doctrine" against the one associated with the name of Brezhnev, stressing our solidarity with the peaceful aspirations of the nations of Eastern Europe and offering cooperation to those of their governments that render themselves, in one way or another, accountable, or more accountable, to the wishes of the people.

Our appeal as Europeans talking to Europeans is strong. We have much to offer and much to deny. We can add to or lighten the economic burden that the Soviet Union now has to shoulder in Eastern Europe. Some

East European governments are more aware of this than others. But they are all aware of the fact that their nations are anxious to be readmitted to Europe, to which they feel they belong by history, culture and sentiment. We can help them to do so, and we can, if we know our business, help them do so without jeopardizing essential Soviet security interests.

Differentiation should also guide our policies towards the USSR. Our study-group has noted that about half the Soviet population is now non-Russian and the non-Russian component is growing. It is clearly in our interest to encourage the hopes of those nations and nationalities that find themselves under Soviet tutelage and are anxiously watching whether the free world might help them with the many peaceful means at its disposal. We should live up to those expectations by making full use -- as is our right and obligation -- of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid agreements, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No one forced the Soviet government to sign these instruments. Both in our government statements and in our propaganda we should unceasingly remind Moscow of its obligations.

Differentiation is a more difficult idea to apply when it comes to the Russian people. Our study-group noted the passivity of the Russian people, the absence of democratic tradition in Russian

culture, and the ease with which patriotism can be mobilized in support of autocracy despite gross oppression. These factors do not augur well for the self-liberation of the Russian people.

We, nevertheless, concluded that there do survive in the Soviet Union, at influential levels, men and women to whom the official ideology and propaganda are repellent and whose predominant motive for service is genuine patriotism.

It is (in practical terms) to these men and women that we should address our message for a better East-West understanding and the reduction of the fear of war. It is to them that we should stress that we have no enmity with the Russian people -- ~~that the fears and suspicions that exist between us are entirely due to Soviet expansionism and the treatment that the Soviet regime imposes on such of its own subjects and subject nations as seek to achieve a measure of freedom, justice and independence.~~

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The principal cause of world anxiety today (we concluded) is ~~not~~ the accumulation of nuclear weapons, ~~nor~~ the fears generated by words, ~~but~~ *than* the nature of the Soviet regime itself.

While it is not in our power to change the character of that regime, we can -- both with our political policies and the skilful use of information policy -- support those forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe that are anxious to reform and humanize the Soviet system and so reduce world tension. This is not doing very much considering what we should be doing in an ideal world -- but it is a great deal more than what we have done.